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Author SHA1 Message Date
minke.yu c8d06424fa gateway metrics: T25b test fix — le buckets are cumulative 2026-10-18 09:53:17 +08:00
minke.yu 97c7eabb33 gateway metrics: T25b fixup — recorder.handle() for 0.17 API 2026-10-18 09:51:58 +08:00
minke.yu e9b436dc2d gateway metrics: explicit histogram buckets for all g9i/router histograms — kill zero-quantile summaries (P2 T25b) 2026-10-18 09:50:23 +08:00
minke.yu fc63ae5392 gateway g9i: T25 test — relax timing-sensitive wait assertion 2026-10-18 08:34:56 +08:00
minke.yu 9df2d40324 gateway g9i: T25 cleanup — drop dead wrapper fns, cfg(test) the test-only ones 2026-10-18 08:31:31 +08:00
minke.yu 6a8a6e399f gateway g9i: T25 fixup — shadow-mode reservoir eligibility is unreachable, not excluded 2026-10-18 08:27:15 +08:00
minke.yu e6c0737541 gateway g9i: T25 fixup — class ttft reads ShadowResponseContext.class 2026-10-18 08:23:53 +08:00
minke.yu 9374e03f13 gateway g9i: hot-channel admission A/B — reservoir + hardlane policies (P2 T25) 2026-10-18 08:21:21 +08:00
minke.yu 86883ae89f gateway g9i: deep placeholder rings anchor classification (P2 T24)
v14 replay (c512, 32836 reqs): T23 chunking works (lookup_depth mean 41,
placeholder 6795 vs engine-hit 7183) but Hot never fired — placeholder
anchors kept suffix_start=0, so every shared-prefix request counted its
whole message list as new work -> ColdLarge. Now a placeholder ring at
depth >= MIN_PLACEHOLDER_DEPTH (2) anchors like a real hit: suffix_start
via ring_msg, matched_node filled (record writes the node on every ring),
anchor_tokens stays 0 (unknown, deliberate). depth==1 placeholders stay
misses (shared-greeting guard). ShadowDecision gains
anchor_is_placeholder; the shadow x engine agreement counter's shadow
axis widens to hit/placeholder/miss via ShadowAnchorKind. KNOWN
LIMITATION pinned in a test: a chunk-ring anchor mid-message hides an
unbounded remainder (wrong-Hot vector for >theta mid-message divergence
after a >=2048B shared prefix). No deploy.
2026-10-17 23:57:44 +08:00
minke.yu 43c2844c18 gateway g9i: intra-message 2048B chunk rings for long-prompt prefix hits (P2 T23)
A per-message chain is blind inside one long message (v13: 9034/9034
depth-0 misses on single-message long-prompt traffic). Text pieces
longer than 2048 bytes now roll into bare chunk rings
xxh3(prev || chunk) before the message-final ring, which carries only
the <=2048-byte tail; texts <=2048 hash byte-identically to pre-T23
(pinned by a verbatim legacy-chain equivalence test). Lookup itself is
unchanged, but classify's suffix_start now maps the hit ring back to
its message index via the new ring_msg sideband (the raw n-depth+1
formula overshoots the message arrays once chains outgrow messages).
No deploy.
2026-10-17 22:33:01 +08:00
minke.yu 9e288079e4 gateway g9i: fix non-stream CL truncation on shadow strip + pre-strip breakdown extraction + shadowxengine agreement metric (T22)
- Bug A (user-visible): non-stream passthrough forwarded the upstream
  Content-Length after the shadow strip had shortened the body ->
  cache-hit non-stream responses truncated (~60B, IncompleteRead).
  non_stream_passthrough_response now pins CL to the actual body length.
- Bug B (order): strip_and_extract returned the post-strip JSON to
  shadow_record, so extract_cached_breakdown always missed and
  smg_g9i_shadow_cache_hit_tokens_total never fired. The breakdown is now
  extracted pre-strip and threaded through record_response_json.
- T22 observability: extract_cached_total (standard
  usage.prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens first, tier breakdown as
  fallback) + smg_g9i_shadow_engine_agreement_total{shadow,engine} 2x2
  counter pairing the request-time lookup hit with the engine's actual
  cached tokens; ShadowResponseContext carries shadow_hit.
2026-10-17 15:11:58 +08:00
minke.yu 738d5a50d0 gateway g9i: shadow semantic gap tests (image-in-prefix/theta boundary/deep hit/shared-prefix repoint/try_consume/reasoning_content) 2026-10-17 10:15:38 +08:00
minke.yu e80c8608dc gateway g9i: --g9i-window-fixed pins the admission window, skipping all AIMD dynamics (P2 T21) 2026-10-17 01:24:23 +08:00
minke.yu 5351d5491b gateway g9i: AIMD warmup tuning (init 128, add 64, CLI flags) + prompt_too_long 400 front validation (P2 T20 A+B) 2026-10-16 20:07:49 +08:00
minke.yu 8a2e1403a3 gateway g9i: blind-state timeout no longer blocks recovery when pipeline < 0.5W (P2 T19 P1) 2026-10-16 15:59:14 +08:00
minke.yu 1910eccb8e gateway g9i: ledger reconcile clamp on sustained ledger>>engine divergence (subtract-only, 60s fuse) (P2 T19 P0-2) 2026-10-16 15:56:56 +08:00
minke.yu 6217b9de46 gateway g9i: TTL reaper for wedged D-ledger bookings (pipeline 120s / streaming 600s) (P2 T19 P0-1) 2026-10-16 15:51:40 +08:00
minke.yu 9dd446b5c1 gateway g9i: AIMD blind-state recovery threshold prealloc < max(1, max_running/4) (P2 T18 hole-4)
The blind-state (no TTFT samples — non-streaming traffic) slow-add
condition required D prealloc_queue == 0, which is unreachable in
production (prealloc sits at 180+ under load), so the window stayed
pinned at WINDOW_MIN=16 forever — the admission window never recovered
after a cut.

New rule: slow-add when prealloc_queue < max(1, max_running_total/4)
(pipeline < 0.8W condition kept; hold-timeout still forces hold). A
missing snapshot for the node is treated as busy (no blind recovery on
zero information).

Test: aimd_blind_holds_while_prealloc_busy replaced by
aimd_blind_recovery_prealloc_threshold (0/10 recover at limit 64,
boundary == limit holds, production-shape 180 holds, max(1, mr/4) floor
at mr=8, missing snapshot holds).
2026-10-16 13:42:48 +08:00
minke.yu f76eaf0f92 gateway g9i: gates judge on last-known snapshots; blind fallback round-robins instead of cache_aware pass-through (P2 T18 hole-3)
The stale-exemption + blind-pass-through combination fed the 2026-10-16
p3 pileup: the most overloaded node answered /v1/loads slowest, its
snapshot went stale first, and staleness EXEMPTED it from every cap
judgment; with all snapshots stale, regular_plan returned
PrefillPlan::Default and the underlying cache_aware radix policy pinned
every same-prefix session onto that one node (p3: 477 queued, TTFT
~300s) while the drained node (p2) got zero traffic.

a) v1_over_cap / p_real_queue_over / least_wait / sorted_by_wait now use
   last-known values: any snapshot that ever fetched OK participates at
   any age; only a NEVER-answered node is unknown (unjudged, unpicked).
   Stale judgments are counted: smg_g9i_stale_snapshot_judged_total{gate}.
b) All-blind (no node ever answered = true cold start) no longer returns
   PrefillPlan::Default — regular_plan round-robins the pool via a new
   rr_cursor (decision path regular_blind_round_robin). Partial blind
   picks the known least-wait node as before. Prefix affinity lives in
   the shadow table (shadow_route), not the underlying policy.
c) reqs_cap=10 / token_cap=16M / hold 1s/512 / HOT-first / stateless
   per-request exclusion semantics unchanged; check_decode_pool freshness
   (TTL) semantics intentionally untouched.

Tests: v1_over_cap_snapshot_semantics + shadow_path_real_queue_gate_filters
updated to the last-known contract; new t18_least_wait_uses_last_known,
t18_all_blind_round_robin_not_default, t18_partial_blind_least_wait_override.
2026-10-16 13:41:09 +08:00
minke.yu 45fdc97082 gateway g9i: concurrent /v1/loads fetch + detached bootstrap scrape loop + last-known snapshot survival (P2 T18 hole-2)
poll_once fetched 4x /v1/loads + 3x P /metrics SERIALLY, each with a 3s
timeout — one round cost up to ~21s against a 5s snapshot TTL, so one
slow node at peak aged the whole pool's snapshots and blinded every
gate (no_fresh_snapshot on ~30% of decisions, 2026-10-16).

- /v1/loads fetches now run concurrently (JoinSet); per-node 3s timeout
  unchanged, a round costs the slowest node, not the sum. Poll interval
  1s / TTL 5s unchanged.
- The per-P /metrics kv_transfer_bootstrap_ms scrape moves to its own
  10s slow loop (concurrent scrapes); it only feeds observability gauges
  and must never delay the snapshot round.
- A failed fetch no longer overwrites the snapshot with a zeroed
  default: the last-known load survives (merge_poll_result) and keeps
  aging via its original fetched_at; a node that never answered stays
  truly unknown instead of fabricating '0 queue'.
- New gauges: smg_g9i_poll_duration_seconds (histogram),
  smg_g9i_snapshot_age_seconds{worker}.

Tests: t18_poll_failure_preserves_last_known (merge semantics),
t18_poll_fetches_concurrently (two hanging nodes cost one timeout, stay
unknown but remain routing candidates).
2026-10-16 13:33:07 +08:00
minke.yu f690861265 gateway g9i: book D pipeline ledger at decision time for deferred (miss) admissions (P2 T18 hole-1)
Root cause of the 2026-10-16 window-gate-blindness incident: for a
prefix-table MISS the D pipeline booking happened in shadow_admit at
response-headers time — and in PD mode headers arrive at ~first-token
time (the dispatch join waits on the prefill answer), so the booking
entered the ledger and was promoted to streaming within milliseconds.
The pipeline gauge pinned at 0 while 585 admitted requests awaited
their first token; the d_window_full gate (pipeline >= W) never fired.

Fix: AdmissionMark gains p_booked + a new_deferred() constructor; the
miss branch of shadow_classify_and_admit books the min-T_D D node into
the pipeline ledger at decision time (P side stays deferred — no node
known). shadow_admit consumes the mark by admitting P on the actual
landing node and rekeying the D booking; shadow_release_unconsumed
releases D (and P only when it was booked). Promote/release paths are
unchanged and conserve: admit = pipeline + streaming, complete/abort
= release exactly once.

Also adds the reconciliation gauge smg_g9i_d_engine_inflight{worker}
(running + prealloc + transfer queue, engine truth) beside the ledger
gauges, so ledger-vs-engine divergence is directly visible.

Tests: t11_miss_defers_admit_to_response rewritten as
t11_miss_books_d_pipeline_at_decision_time; new
t18_deferred_promote_release_conservation (promote idempotent,
mid-stream disconnect release, post-consume fallback no-op) and
t18_deferred_abort_pre_first_token_releases_pipeline (double-release
guard).
2026-10-16 13:28:08 +08:00
minke.yu e4bfdc949b gateway g9i: AIMD blind-state recovery on real engine signals + real-queue P gate + nonstream e2e metric (P2 T17) 2026-10-16 11:16:32 +08:00
minke.yu 59e3aee6d9 gateway g9i: pipeline-depth window (streaming excluded) + tiered hold queue + 1s hold budget (P2 T16) 2026-10-16 09:43:54 +08:00
minke.yu 406081d3e3 gateway g9i: admission hold queue (429 -> park) + AIMD window rebalance to 1x/0.25x capacity (P2 T15) 2026-10-16 08:27:52 +08:00
minke.yu 1975265315 gateway g9i: AIMD congestion window replaces slot-estimate admission gate (P2 T14) 2026-10-16 01:33:18 +08:00
minke.yu 534417b82e gateway g9i: D-side in-flight ledger + Little's-law slot release rate (P2 T13) 2026-10-15 23:21:42 +08:00
minke.yu ed0a454730 gateway g9i: T_D slot (max_running) dimension — max(memory, slot) wait with dual EWMA (P2 T12) 2026-10-15 21:41:03 +08:00
minke.yu 04ee2d03d7 gateway g9i: atomic check-and-act admission at decision time (P2 T11) 2026-10-15 18:20:01 +08:00
minke.yu 9d5db13e53 gateway g9i: P-queue hard token cap with candidate fallback (P2 T10) 2026-10-15 17:38:17 +08:00
minke.yu 7e20f0af79 gateway g9i: P2 T_D admission gates (off|shadow|enforce) + T_PREFER candidate fallback (T9) 2026-10-15 13:35:50 +08:00
minke.yu 0b74ab2ac4 gateway g9i: shadow-consistent routing switch --g9i-shadow-route (P1 shadow T7) 2026-10-14 22:22:58 +08:00
minke.yu 3c7ec33d26 gateway g9i: est_T_D shadow metrics — est_tp/est_td histograms, residual by dominant component, pool gauges (P1 shadow T5) 2026-10-14 21:52:07 +08:00
minke.yu 09ca4957ee gateway g9i: scrape P /metrics kv_transfer_bootstrap_ms as est_T_D ground truth (P1 shadow T4) 2026-10-14 21:50:11 +08:00
minke.yu 7921442a5c gateway g9i: est_TTFT max(T_P, min_D T_D) composition with C4/C13 degradation (P1 shadow T3) 2026-10-14 21:44:17 +08:00
minke.yu 05ef104208 gateway g9i: pool_free_rate completion EWMA per decode node (P1 shadow T2) 2026-10-14 21:34:56 +08:00
minke.yu d44620f285 gateway g9i: fetch disagg/queues sections in /v1/loads, extend NodeLoad for est_T_D (P1 shadow T1) 2026-10-14 21:21:11 +08:00
minke.yu 5df4f2c036 DEBUG-ONLY: use crc32 for rid fingerprint (builtin hash() is per-process randomized) 2026-10-13 18:12:56 +08:00
minke.yu db1e8cdbe3 DEBUG-ONLY: ARDBG batch fingerprint + phase + hicache sync logs, sampled device AR (1/1024) + idle spin sampling (p2 wedge trap) 2026-10-13 18:01:36 +08:00
minke.yu f3ac513d92 DEBUG-ONLY: limit ARDBG stack logging to ONE_SHOT_PUSH calls (volume control) 2026-10-13 16:01:18 +08:00
minke.yu 0054c5b8fe DEBUG-ONLY: SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG seq logging for TP device AR + host CP gloo AR (p2 wedge repro) 2026-10-13 15:52:17 +08:00
minke.yu 6da0a40b02 g9i shadow: fix temporary-borrow compile errors in new tests 2026-10-13 15:39:06 +08:00
minke.yu caf3403086 g9i shadow: fix cached_tokens_details placement to sglext container
Verified against serving_chat.py/protocol.py on this branch: the engine
emits cached_tokens_details under top-level "sglext" (SglExt), omitted
entirely when all fields are None; ids-framed streams emit a standalone
choices=[] sglext chunk with no usage. extract_cached_breakdown now reads
sglext first (usage/top-level kept as fallbacks); strip_cached_details_from
removes the field from sglext and drops the emptied key; process_sse_chunk
pre-filters on "sglext" too and drops events that only carried stripped
fields. Adds 5 placement tests.
2026-10-13 15:33:03 +08:00
minke.yu 617f19ba61 gateway tests: fix PDRouter initializer missing g9i field (pre-existing test compile break) 2026-10-13 15:18:33 +08:00
minke.yu ba3318ffbd gateway g9i: fix shadow compile errors — lookup returns owned snapshot (borrow across loop mutation), bind temp in test 2026-10-13 15:14:05 +08:00
minke.yu 8279d3d6df gateway g9i: v2 P1 shadow mode — prefix-hash chain, bookkeeping table, shadow classifier + queue model
Observability only, zero routing influence, gated by --g9i-shadow-enabled
(requires --g9i-enabled). Design: experiments/g9i/g9i-v2-design-20261013.md.

- g9i_prefix_chain.rs: rolling xxh3 chain over chat messages (seed folds
  model/template-kwargs/tools/system; tool_calls/tool_call_id/name hashed;
  byte-level image semantics; unclassifiable flag for unknown parts)
- g9i_shadow.rs: PrefixTable (LRU+TTL, deepest-hit lookup, exact tail
  anchor + placeholder middle boundaries), ShadowClassifier (hot/short/
  cold_image/cold_large/cold_unknown via byte heuristic), QueueModel
  (per-(node,class) outstanding + completion-driven drain EWMA, est_TTFT),
  usage/cached_tokens_details injection+strip pairing
- pd_router.rs: request-side shadow classify + agreement counters (shadow
  vs v1 probe verdict), response-side usage harvest on stream/non-stream,
  queue admit/complete/release conservation incl. abort paths
- main.rs: --g9i-shadow-enabled/-table-max-entries/-table-ttl-secs

Not yet compile-verified (no local toolchain); b300 container check next.
2026-10-13 15:05:56 +08:00
minke.yu ef4cccb6a0 gateway g9i: allow flow-control-only mode (no fast-P URL) — B case flat pool 2026-10-13 01:31:57 +08:00
minke.yu 98b950366d mooncake PD transfer: mix bootstrap_room into lane shard hash (fixes 1/16 lane collapse with single decode instance) 2026-10-12 23:41:23 +08:00
minke.yu 87ab6c0155 gateway g9i: probe fast-P only + L3-inclusive classification + exact-body probe cache (A案; removes accidentally reintroduced home_hit) 2026-10-12 13:03:54 +00:00
minke.yu 0308920bdb gateway g9i: retry probe once on transport errors (stale keep-alive pool)
Observed twice on 2026-10-12: reqwest reused server-closed pooled connections,
all-candidate probes failed with connect-level errors, fail-closed 429 drowned
hit-class traffic. Retry once on is_connect/is_request (ms-scale reconnect);
timeouts stay non-retried (wedged engine + 6s worst-case TTFT budget).
2026-10-12 12:02:49 +00:00
minke.yu 57db2a4ae9 gateway g9i: fail-closed 429 on probe failure / fast-P snapshot loss (p2 incident)
User directive 2026-10-12: 先严格429. When p2 hung, the fail-open fallback dumped
all classified traffic into the regular pool and drowned it (7.5M pending tokens).
All probe-failure paths now reject: prefill_probe_failed (429) when no candidate
can answer /query_cache_hit; fast_p_no_snapshot (429) when snapshots go stale
between probe and pick, with boot grace (had_any_success) mirroring the D gate.
2026-10-12 10:16:09 +00:00
minke.yu 7fd7fd58a5 gateway g9i: hit class always routes to fast-P pool (命中都在 fast-P 发生)
User directive 2026-10-12: read-your-own-node home routing sent hit-class
requests back onto the regular-P long-prefill queue (150s p50 observed),
defeating the fast path. Hit class now always goes to the fast-P pool
(least-wait aggregate); fast-P resolves the prefix from its own L2 or the
shared L3 (wait_complete), recompute-and-graft otherwise — self-healing
land-and-stay. Home override removed; fast-P overload is handled only by
the fast_p_queue 429 gate. New decision counter routed_fast_p_from_regular
distinguishes L3-fetch/recompute hits from local-L2 hits (observability).
2026-10-12 02:20:12 +00:00
minke.yuandKimi 71a72b8fea gateway g9i: keep large prefills off fast-P even without least-wait
regular_plan returned Default when regular_pool_least_wait=false, letting
the router policy pick across ALL prefill workers including the fast-P
node — ~1/3 of large prefills landed on fast-P under random policy
(observed 2026-10-12), polluting its small-prefill queue and L2. With a
fast-P configured, 'regular' now explicitly restricts to the regular
pool via the least-wait aggregate pick. Default is kept only when the
fast pool is empty (then it equals the regular pool anyway).

Co-authored-by: Kimi
2026-10-12 08:58:03 +08:00
minke.yuandKimi 6c9518fcd8 gateway g9i: move ProbeHit to module scope (fix compile)
Co-authored-by: Kimi
2026-10-12 08:20:30 +08:00
minke.yuandKimi 3a4ab451ac gateway g9i: classify on local (L1+L2) hits only, probe the whole pool
Follow-up to the home-hit routing fix. Two flaws remained:

1. The engine's /query_cache_hit new_tokens counts shared-L3 hits. Mooncake
   pages are metadata-visible (Exist) before the put finishes, so fast-P
   claimed long prefixes it could not actually serve: the gateway classified
   'small prefill, fast-P has it' while the engine prefetch found nothing
   and recomputed 76k cold — and the probe loop broke at fast-P before ever
   asking the home regular-P, which held an immediate L2 copy.

2. The probe loop stopped at the first answering node, so 'which node holds
   the prefix' was only ever 'fast-P or whoever got asked first'.

Now every fresh candidate is probed (fast pool first, early-out only on a
fully-local prompt), and the routing decision uses local_new = total - l1 -
l2. Ties keep probe order so fresh short prompts with no hits still land on
fast-P.

Co-authored-by: Kimi
2026-10-12 08:17:52 +08:00
minke.yuandKimi 5d38fc96a9 gateway g9i: route small prefills to the node that actually holds the prefix
classify_prefill remembered only new_tokens from the /query_cache_hit probe
and sent every small-prefill request to the fast-P pool. A multi-turn session
whose home P is a regular node therefore landed on fast-P with a local miss:
either a full prefix recompute or a wait for the cross-node L3 backup to
become visible (seconds for long prefixes; observed 10-20s for 76k).

Now the probe records which worker answered. When the prefix lives on a
regular-P the request is Override-routed home (immediate L2 hit), subject to
the same regular_p_queue est-wait 429 gate. Fast-P keeps serving sessions
whose prefix it already holds (its own L2) and brand-new short prefills.

Co-authored-by: Kimi
2026-10-12 08:01:10 +08:00
minke.yu 261ebbc55b G9i: regular-P queue admission gate (est wait > 10s -> 429 regular_p_queue) 2026-10-12 00:25:52 +08:00
minke.yu 53fb9be7ee G9i: TTFT p95/p99 statistics (observability only, no admission gate) 2026-10-11 22:31:30 +08:00
minke.yu e5be84f795 G9i: probe classification across pool candidates (fast-P then regular)
t15 stress through the gateway showed /query_cache_hit failing on the
sole fast-P under exactly the load where classification matters (p1
queue 62 / pending 4.7M tokens, 160 probe errors -> fallback). Probe
order is now fast-P least-wait first, regular pool as backup; first
successful answer classifies; unclassifiable (multimodal 400) still
short-circuits; total failure falls back to default routing.
2026-10-11 21:15:59 +08:00
minke.yu 39ceba8a3d G9i: router-side pool admission + fast-P routing (gateway)
Pool-aware admission control and small-prefill routing, entirely in
sgl-model-gateway (zero engine changes). Consumes G9 P0 engine surfaces:
/v1/loads (per-dp-rank snapshots, summed to per-node instance-level
views) and /query_cache_hit (new-token classification).

Decision tree per request, before PD dispatch and outside the retry
loop (own 429s are never retried):
  1. D-pool gate: sum of fresh num_running_reqs over decode pool >
     threshold -> 429 d_pool_saturated (fail-open on missing snapshots;
     engine max-running-requests is the hard backstop).
  2. Chat routes: probe least-wait fast-P /query_cache_hit; new_tokens
     < max_new_tokens (tentative 4096) -> fast-P pool.
  3. Pool selection: least estimated wait (queued_total_input_tokens /
     max(drain_rate, floor)) — doubles as the load balancer for the
     multi-fast-P / multi-D future; pool membership is config-only.
  4. Fast-P queue gate: least-wait estimate > threshold (tentative 5s)
     -> 429 fast_p_queue with x-estimated-wait-s.

CLI: --g9i-enabled/--g9i-fast-prefill-url/--g9i-max-new-tokens/
--g9i-fast-p-queue-reject-secs/--g9i-decode-max-running/... all numbers
tentative and centralized (user directive: fixed by measurement later).
Metrics: smg_g9i_decisions_total/rejects_total/no_fresh_snapshot_total,
per-node running gauge, probe latency histogram.
2026-10-11 19:14:40 +08:00
minke.yu b9d259441c deploy: l3test stack image -> e7dc175e9 (G9 P0 fixes baked in) 2026-10-11 17:47:24 +08:00
16 changed files with 11863 additions and 19 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
# 端口: P1=30000 P2=30010 P3=30020 D=30001 router=30002
# bootstrap: P1=8998 P2=8999 P3=9000 D=9001
x-sglang-common: &sglang-common
image: ymkymx/sglang:dsv41-pd-visioncp-6612af9e0-local-20261011-0740
image: ymkymx/sglang:dsv41-pd-visioncp-e7dc175e9-local-20261011-0940
shm_size: "32gb"
ipc: host
pid: host
@@ -2998,12 +2998,22 @@ class MooncakeKVManager(StagingManagerMixin, CommonKVManager):
# add further chunks into the transfer queue.
return
# NOTE(shangming): sharding according to the dst_infos to make sure
# requests with the same dst_sessions will be added into the same
# queue, which enables early abort with failed sessions.
# Shard by dst session ports AND bootstrap_room. The port term alone
# degenerates to a constant when all requests target a single decode
# instance (its session ports are fixed), collapsing every transfer
# onto 1/16 of the lanes and throttling P->D intake (measured at
# client concurrency 300: #transfer-req piled at 100+ while decode
# itself stayed healthy). Mixing in bootstrap_room keeps all chunks
# of one request on the same lane (per-request FIFO order preserved)
# while spreading distinct rooms across all lanes. Abort/cleanup is
# unaffected: chunks are dropped per-room at dequeue via
# request_status (see the worker loop) and per-request via
# failed_sessions before send — no lane-level purge exists, and the
# deferred abort ack is room-scoped (_staging_outstanding). Same
# trade-off as mori/conn.py which shards by bootstrap_room alone.
dst_infos = self.transfer_infos[bootstrap_room].keys()
session_port_sum = sum(int(session.rsplit(":", 1)[1]) for session in dst_infos)
shard_idx = session_port_sum % len(self.transfer_queues)
shard_idx = (session_port_sum + bootstrap_room) % len(self.transfer_queues)
if trace_ctx is None:
trace_ctx = TraceNullContext()
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import zlib
from array import array
from collections import deque
from http import HTTPStatus
@@ -105,6 +107,64 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_is_npu = is_npu()
# DEBUG-ONLY (p2 wedge trap 2026-10-13): per-step batch-decision fingerprint
# and event-loop phase logging. Same env as custom_all_reduce_v2 ARDBG.
# 1 = sampled/one-line, 2 = + stacks on ONE_SHOT_PUSH. Off by default.
_AR_SEQ_DEBUG = int(os.environ.get("SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG", "0"))
_plan_seq = 0
_plan_none_seq = 0
def _dbg_plan(self, batch) -> None:
global _plan_seq, _plan_none_seq
if not _AR_SEQ_DEBUG:
return
_plan_seq += 1
rank = torch.distributed.get_rank()
if batch is None:
# 空转步采样记录,避免 idle 自旋刷爆日志
_plan_none_seq += 1
if _plan_none_seq & 511:
return
logger.info("[ARDBG] plan rank=%s step=%d batch=None", rank, _plan_seq)
return
reqs = batch.reqs
fp = 0
ext_total = 0
for r in reqs:
# crc32 而非 hash():后者按进程随机化种子,跨 rank 不可比
fp = (fp * 131 + zlib.crc32(r.rid.encode())) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
er = getattr(r, "extend_range", None)
el = int(er.length) if er is not None else -1
fp = (fp * 131 + el) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
fp = (fp * 131 + int(getattr(r, "prefix_len", -1))) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
if el > 0:
ext_total += el
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] plan rank=%s step=%d nreq=%d ext=%d fp=%016x",
rank,
_plan_seq,
len(reqs),
ext_total,
fp,
)
def _dbg_phase(label: str, batch=None) -> None:
if not _AR_SEQ_DEBUG:
return
if batch is None and label in ("inflight_enter", "inflight_exit"):
# 空转迭代的 inflight 相位价值低,采样记录
if _plan_seq & 255:
return
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] phase rank=%s step=%s %s nreq=%s",
torch.distributed.get_rank(),
_plan_seq,
label,
len(batch.reqs) if batch is not None else "-",
)
def should_force_retry(req: Req) -> bool:
"""Test hook to force a request into optimistic prefill retry."""
@@ -628,6 +688,7 @@ class SchedulerDisaggregationPrefillMixin:
if batch:
set_schedule_time_batch(batch)
_dbg_plan(self, batch)
return NextBatchPlan(batch_to_run=batch, running_batch=running_batch)
@torch.no_grad()
@@ -658,13 +719,17 @@ class SchedulerDisaggregationPrefillMixin:
if batch:
if self.enable_staging:
self.maybe_prefetch_staging_for_batch(batch)
_dbg_phase("run_batch_enter", batch)
result = self.run_batch(batch)
_dbg_phase("run_batch_exit", batch)
self.process_batch_result(batch, result)
else:
self._sched_idled = True
self.on_idle()
_dbg_phase("inflight_enter")
self.process_disagg_prefill_inflight_queue()
_dbg_phase("inflight_exit")
# Update last_batch
self.last_batch = batch
@@ -698,7 +763,9 @@ class SchedulerDisaggregationPrefillMixin:
if batch:
if self.enable_staging:
self.maybe_prefetch_staging_for_batch(batch)
_dbg_phase("run_batch_enter", batch)
batch_result = self.run_batch(batch)
_dbg_phase("run_batch_exit", batch)
self._apply_war_barrier()
self.result_queue.append((batch.copy(), batch_result))
else:
@@ -713,7 +780,9 @@ class SchedulerDisaggregationPrefillMixin:
# When the server is idle, do self-check and re-init some states
self.on_idle()
_dbg_phase("inflight_enter")
self.process_disagg_prefill_inflight_queue()
_dbg_phase("inflight_exit")
# Run sample of the current batch
# It depends on the result of the last batch (e.g., grammar), so we run it after the last batch is processed.
+36 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import random
from collections import deque
from contextlib import nullcontext
@@ -43,6 +45,32 @@ if is_npu():
DSV4NPUTokenToKVPool,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# DEBUG-ONLY (p2 wedge repro 2026-10-13): env-gated seq logging for host-side
# gloo all-reduce sync points. Mirrors SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG in
# custom_all_reduce_v2.py. 1 = one-line, 2 = + python stack. Not for prod.
_AR_SEQ_DEBUG = int(os.environ.get("SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG", "0"))
_host_ar_seq = 0
def _dbg_log_host_ar(phase: str, polls) -> None:
global _host_ar_seq
if not _AR_SEQ_DEBUG:
return
seq = _host_ar_seq
_host_ar_seq += 1
# 空转迭代(无 poller)采样 1/256,避免 idle 自旋刷爆日志
if (not polls) and seq & 255:
return
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] host rank=%s seq=%d phase=%s polls=%s",
dist.get_rank(),
seq,
phase,
polls,
)
#########################
# Constants & Enums
#########################
@@ -213,13 +241,20 @@ def poll_and_all_reduce_attn_cp_tp_group(
attn_cp_cpu_group: dist.ProcessGroup,
attn_tp_cpu_group: dist.ProcessGroup,
):
# DEBUG-ONLY
_dbg_log_host_ar("enter", len(pollers))
# First sync across attn-tp ranks so all TP participants for a given (dp, cp)
# shard observe the same status transitions.
polls = poll_and_all_reduce(pollers, attn_tp_cpu_group)
# DEBUG-ONLY
_dbg_log_host_ar("tp-done", polls)
# Then sync across attn-cp ranks, so all TPxCP participants in one DP shard
# converge to the same global status.
return _all_reduce_polls(polls, attn_cp_cpu_group)
result = _all_reduce_polls(polls, attn_cp_cpu_group)
# DEBUG-ONLY
_dbg_log_host_ar("cp-done", result)
return result
def poll_and_all_reduce_with_staging(
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ the kernel captured in the graph dereferences its row at replay time.
"""
import logging
import os
import traceback
from contextlib import contextmanager
from typing import List, NamedTuple, Optional, Tuple
@@ -68,6 +70,9 @@ MB = 1024 * 1024
_ALIGN_BYTES = 1024
_SEMAPHORE_BYTES = 128
_MAX_GRAPH_INPUTS = 131072
# DEBUG-ONLY (p2 wedge repro 2026-10-13): env-gated seq logging for TP device
# all-reduce calls. 1 = one-line per call, 2 = + python stack. Not for prod.
_AR_SEQ_DEBUG = int(os.environ.get("SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG", "0"))
# resolved once at import time; explicit constructor sizes take precedence
_DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE = envs.SGLANG_CUSTOM_ALL_REDUCE_V2_MAX_SIZE_KB.get() * 1024
# forced per-direction workspace sizes; highest priority, override both the
@@ -297,6 +302,9 @@ class CustomAllReduceV2:
self.pull_enabled,
)
dist.barrier(group=self.group)
# DEBUG-ONLY: per-instance seq counter for SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG logging
self._dbg_seq = 0
self._dbg_rank = self.rank
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Algo selection
@@ -376,6 +384,27 @@ class CustomAllReduceV2:
assert config is not None, f"No config for {nbytes = }"
algo, use_graph, use_multicast = config
graph_params = self._allocate_graph_row(input, nbytes) if use_graph else None
if _AR_SEQ_DEBUG:
seq = self._dbg_seq
self._dbg_seq += 1
# 采样 1/1024:生产高频路径下全量日志会拖垮 P 节点
if seq & 1023 == 0:
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] dev rank=%s seq=%d nbytes=%d algo=%s graph=%s capturing=%s",
self._dbg_rank,
seq,
nbytes,
getattr(algo, "name", algo),
use_graph,
torch.cuda.is_current_stream_capturing(),
)
if _AR_SEQ_DEBUG >= 2 and getattr(algo, "name", algo) == "ONE_SHOT_PUSH":
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] stack rank=%s seq=%d\n%s",
self._dbg_rank,
seq,
"".join(traceback.format_stack(limit=15)),
)
return custom_all_reduce(
self.obj,
input,
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import atexit
import logging
import os
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import replace
@@ -132,6 +133,11 @@ COMPONENT_REGISTRY: dict[ComponentType, type[TreeComponent]] = {
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# DEBUG-ONLY (p2 wedge trap 2026-10-13): env-gated logging for the per-step
# hicache event sync. Same SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG switch as the ARDBG sites.
_AR_SEQ_DEBUG = int(os.environ.get("SGLANG_AR_SEQ_DEBUG", "0"))
_hc_step = 0
class _OngoingWriteThrough(NamedTuple):
"""Tracks an in-flight D→H write-through operation."""
@@ -3533,6 +3539,16 @@ class UnifiedRadixCache(BasePrefixCache):
def check_hicache_events(self) -> None:
"""Called per scheduler step to poll async HiCache events."""
global _hc_step
if _AR_SEQ_DEBUG:
_hc_step += 1
if _hc_step & 255 == 0:
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] hcev rank=%s step=%d linker=%s",
torch.distributed.get_rank(),
_hc_step,
self.linker is not None,
)
if self.linker is not None:
finish_counts = torch.tensor(
[
@@ -3566,6 +3582,15 @@ class UnifiedRadixCache(BasePrefixCache):
storage_queue_sizes,
extra_pool_names,
) = self._sync_hicache_ready_counts()
if _AR_SEQ_DEBUG and _hc_step & 255 == 0:
logger.info(
"[ARDBG] hcsync rank=%s step=%d write=%s load=%s storage=%s",
torch.distributed.get_rank(),
_hc_step,
write_finish_count,
load_finish_count,
storage_queue_sizes,
)
self.writing_check(finish_count=write_finish_count)
self.loading_check(finish_count=load_finish_count)
+6
View File
@@ -378,6 +378,12 @@ impl RouterConfigBuilder {
self
}
/// G9i pool-aware admission control + fast-P routing config (PD mode).
pub fn g9i(mut self, g9i: Option<crate::routers::http::g9i::G9iConfig>) -> Self {
self.config.g9i = g9i;
self
}
pub fn model_path<S: Into<String>>(mut self, path: S) -> Self {
self.config.model_path = Some(path.into());
self
+4
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ pub struct RouterConfig {
/// Enable WASM support
#[serde(default)]
pub enable_wasm: bool,
/// G9i pool-aware admission control + fast-P routing (PD mode, HTTP only).
#[serde(default)]
pub g9i: Option<crate::routers::http::g9i::G9iConfig>,
}
/// Tokenizer cache configuration
@@ -551,6 +554,7 @@ impl Default for RouterConfig {
ca_certificates: vec![],
mcp_config: None,
enable_wasm: false,
g9i: None,
server_cert: None,
server_key: None,
}
+198
View File
@@ -219,6 +219,155 @@ struct CliArgs {
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 30, help_heading = "PD Disaggregation")]
worker_startup_check_interval: u64,
// ==================== G9i: Pool Admission + Fast-P Routing ====================
/// Enable G9i pool-aware admission control + fast-P routing (PD HTTP mode)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = false, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_enabled: bool,
/// Fast-P pool member base URLs (repeatable; router-side role, engine unaware)
#[arg(long, action = ArgAction::Append, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_fast_prefill_url: Vec<String>,
/// Small-prefill cutoff on NEW tokens (total - prefix hit). Tentative; tune by bench.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 4096, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_max_new_tokens: u64,
/// 429 when the least-wait fast-P queue estimate exceeds this many seconds. Tentative.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 5.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_fast_p_queue_reject_secs: f64,
/// D-pool admission ceiling: sum of in-processing requests across decode nodes. Tentative.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 256, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_decode_max_running: u64,
/// 429 when the least-wait REGULAR pool queue estimate exceeds this many seconds. Tentative 10.0; 0=off.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 10.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_regular_p_queue_reject_secs: f64,
/// Drain-rate floor (tok/s) for queue-wait estimates (div-by-zero / cold-start guard)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 1000.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_drain_rate_floor: f64,
/// Snapshot poll interval (seconds)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 1, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_poll_interval_secs: u64,
/// Snapshot TTL — stale nodes leave pool decisions (seconds)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 5, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_snapshot_ttl_secs: u64,
/// No fresh D-pool snapshot: "allow" (default, fail-open + warn) or "reject"
#[arg(long, default_value = "allow", value_parser = ["allow", "reject"], help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_d_no_snapshot: String,
/// /query_cache_hit probe timeout per request (ms)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 2000, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_cache_hit_query_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Also least-wait route the regular P pool (default: keep configured policy)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = false, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_regular_pool_least_wait: bool,
/// Sliding window for TTFT p95/p99 statistics publication (seconds; observability only, never gates)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 300, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_ttft_window_s: u64,
/// G9i v2 shadow mode: prefix-chain bookkeeping + shadow classifier + queue model (observability only, zero routing effect; requires --g9i-enabled)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = false, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_shadow_enabled: bool,
/// Shadow prefix-table capacity in entries (LRU + TTL evicted)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 100_000, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_shadow_table_max_entries: usize,
/// Shadow prefix-table entry TTL (seconds)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 86400, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_shadow_table_ttl_secs: u64,
/// est_T_D shadow estimate (D-side prealloc wait folded into shadow est_TTFT; observability only, default on; set false to roll back to the P-only model exactly)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = true, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_est_td_enabled: bool,
/// Shadow-consistent routing: live prefill pick follows the shadow decision's matched_node (requires --g9i-shadow-enabled; rejection gates unchanged; default off)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = false, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_shadow_route: bool,
/// T_D admission mode: off (default, ≡ current behavior) | shadow (log/count would-rejects, allow) | enforce (real 429s; requires --g9i-shadow-enabled)
#[arg(long, default_value = "off", help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_td_admit: String,
/// T_D hard gate (seconds): when min over decode nodes of T_D exceeds this, every class gets 429 d_prealloc_saturated (0 = disabled)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 5.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_td_gate_secs: f64,
/// T_PREFER (seconds): prefix-holder affinity yields to a cheaper prefill candidate when the holder's est_TTFT exceeds this
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 2.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_t_prefer_secs: f64,
/// Hard P-queue token cap (physical backstop; effective cap = min(this, drain_ewma x budget)) — 429 p_queue_cap only when ALL nodes over (0 = disabled; follows --g9i-td-admit mode)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 16_000_000, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_p_queue_token_cap: u64,
/// P-queue real-queue gate: skip prefill nodes whose engine-reported waiting queue (num_waiting_reqs) exceeds this (0 = disabled; follows --g9i-td-admit mode)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 10, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_p_queue_reqs_cap: u64,
/// Admission hold queue: park holdable rejections (d_window_full / p_queue_cap) up to this many seconds instead of an immediate 429 (0 = disabled; enforce mode only; hold time counts into TTFT)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 1.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_admit_hold_secs: f64,
/// Admission hold queue bound: at most this many parked requests (full queue = immediate 429)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 512, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_admit_hold_max: u64,
/// D-ledger pipeline booking TTL (seconds): force-release bookings that never saw a first token (wedge backstop; 0 = disabled)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 120, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_pipeline_ttl_secs: u64,
/// D-ledger streaming booking TTL (seconds): force-release bookings stuck mid-decode (0 = disabled)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 600, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_streaming_ttl_secs: u64,
/// Ledger reconcile: clamp the D ledger down to the engine-side in-flight when the excess is sustained >60s (subtract-only)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = true, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_ledger_reconcile: bool,
/// AIMD window initial pipeline depth per decode node (warmup start; clamped to [16, 256])
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 128.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_window_init: f64,
/// AIMD additive-increase step per no-congestion tick (slo_ok / blind_recover; cut & holds unchanged)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 64.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_window_add: f64,
/// Pin the AIMD admission window at this value (clamped to [16, 256]); skips all window dynamics (0 = normal AIMD)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 0.0, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_window_fixed: f64,
/// Prompt-length hard validation: 400 prompt_too_long at the front of admission when even the lower-bound estimate exceeds the context limit (default on)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = true, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_prompt_validation: bool,
/// Context-length limit (tokens) for the prompt_too_long lower-bound check (0 = disabled)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 1_048_576, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_prompt_token_limit: u64,
/// T25 hot-channel admission A/B policy: off (default ≡ current behavior) | reservoir (Hot-class holdable rejections park in a priority reservoir up to --g9i-reservoir-max-ms instead of 429) | hardlane (cold classes may use only (1 - --g9i-hot-reserve-frac) of the d_window/p_queue budgets)
#[arg(long, default_value = "off", help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_hot_policy: String,
/// T25-A reservoir wait budget in milliseconds (timeout → 429 reservoir_timeout; the wait counts into TTFT)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 1000, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_reservoir_max_ms: u64,
/// T25-A reservoir capacity: at most this many parked requests (full → immediate 429 reservoir_full)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 512, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_reservoir_cap: u64,
/// T25-B hardlane cold-budget reserve fraction: cold classes use at most (1 - frac) of the AIMD d_window and p_queue caps (fixed value, no adaptation)
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 0.25, help_heading = "G9i Pool Admission")]
g9i_hot_reserve_frac: f64,
// ==================== Service Discovery (Kubernetes) ====================
/// Enable Kubernetes service discovery
#[arg(
@@ -1070,11 +1219,60 @@ impl CliArgs {
.circuit_breaker(!self.disable_circuit_breaker)
.enable_wasm(self.enable_wasm)
.igw(self.enable_igw)
.g9i(self.build_g9i_config()?)
.maybe_server_cert_and_key(self.tls_cert_path.as_ref(), self.tls_key_path.as_ref());
builder.build()
}
/// G9i pool admission + fast-P routing config; None when the feature is off.
fn build_g9i_config(&self) -> ConfigResult<Option<smg::routers::http::g9i::G9iConfig>> {
if !self.g9i_enabled && self.g9i_fast_prefill_url.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
let config = smg::routers::http::g9i::G9iConfig {
enabled: self.g9i_enabled,
fast_prefill_urls: self.g9i_fast_prefill_url.clone(),
max_new_tokens: self.g9i_max_new_tokens,
fast_p_queue_reject_secs: self.g9i_fast_p_queue_reject_secs,
regular_p_queue_reject_secs: self.g9i_regular_p_queue_reject_secs,
decode_max_running: self.g9i_decode_max_running,
drain_rate_floor: self.g9i_drain_rate_floor,
poll_interval_secs: self.g9i_poll_interval_secs,
snapshot_ttl_secs: self.g9i_snapshot_ttl_secs,
d_no_snapshot: self.g9i_d_no_snapshot.clone(),
cache_hit_query_timeout_ms: self.g9i_cache_hit_query_timeout_ms,
regular_pool_least_wait: self.g9i_regular_pool_least_wait,
ttft_window_s: self.g9i_ttft_window_s,
shadow_enabled: self.g9i_shadow_enabled,
shadow_table_max_entries: self.g9i_shadow_table_max_entries,
shadow_table_ttl_secs: self.g9i_shadow_table_ttl_secs,
est_td_enabled: self.g9i_est_td_enabled,
shadow_route: self.g9i_shadow_route,
td_admit: self.g9i_td_admit.clone(),
td_gate_secs: self.g9i_td_gate_secs,
t_prefer_secs: self.g9i_t_prefer_secs,
p_queue_token_cap: self.g9i_p_queue_token_cap,
p_queue_reqs_cap: self.g9i_p_queue_reqs_cap,
admit_hold_secs: self.g9i_admit_hold_secs,
admit_hold_max: self.g9i_admit_hold_max,
pipeline_ttl_secs: self.g9i_pipeline_ttl_secs,
streaming_ttl_secs: self.g9i_streaming_ttl_secs,
ledger_reconcile: self.g9i_ledger_reconcile,
window_init: self.g9i_window_init,
window_add: self.g9i_window_add,
window_fixed: self.g9i_window_fixed,
prompt_validation: self.g9i_prompt_validation,
prompt_token_limit: self.g9i_prompt_token_limit,
hot_policy: self.g9i_hot_policy.clone(),
reservoir_max_ms: self.g9i_reservoir_max_ms,
reservoir_cap: self.g9i_reservoir_cap,
hot_reserve_frac: self.g9i_hot_reserve_frac,
};
config.validate().map_err(|reason| ConfigError::ValidationFailed { reason })?;
Ok(Some(config))
}
fn to_server_config(&self, router_config: RouterConfig) -> ServerConfig {
let service_discovery_config = if self.service_discovery {
// Get router discovery config from router_config.discovery if available
+126 -2
View File
@@ -334,6 +334,64 @@ pub(crate) fn init_metrics() {
smg_mesh::metrics::init_mesh_metrics();
}
/// T25b: explicit Prometheus histogram buckets for every gateway histogram
/// NOT covered by the `duration_seconds` suffix matcher (those keep the
/// configurable duration_buckets). Root cause being fixed: without explicit
/// buckets the exporter renders histograms as client-side SUMMARIES
/// (DDSketch over a 3×20s rolling window); in the v16 deployment those
/// summaries exported all-zero quantiles while _sum/_count stayed healthy
/// (the rolling-window path silently drops samples when the quanta clock
/// reading falls behind the newest bucket begin, poisoning the summary
/// permanently). Explicit buckets render real Prometheus histograms —
/// aggregable across time and replicas with histogram_quantile, and immune
/// to the summary path entirely.
///
/// Groups by scale (keep in sync when adding a histogram!):
/// * TTFT-scale seconds (0.5–120s): TTFT, e2e, est_T_P/T_D, residuals
/// (signed values fall into the lowest bucket — acceptable),
/// bootstrap actuals;
/// * fine seconds (5ms–5s): TPOT, hold/reservoir waits, retry backoff;
/// * prefix lookup depth (ring count, 1–400);
/// * shadow-table evicted entry age (1s–1d).
fn histogram_bucket_overrides() -> Vec<(Matcher, Vec<f64>)> {
let ttft: Vec<f64> = vec![0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 10.0, 20.0, 30.0, 60.0, 120.0];
let fine: Vec<f64> = vec![0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0];
let depth: Vec<f64> = vec![1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 5.0, 10.0, 20.0, 50.0, 100.0, 200.0, 400.0];
let age: Vec<f64> = vec![1.0, 10.0, 60.0, 300.0, 900.0, 3600.0, 21600.0, 86400.0];
let mut out: Vec<(Matcher, Vec<f64>)> = Vec::new();
for name in [
"smg_g9i_ttft_seconds",
"smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds",
"smg_g9i_nonstream_e2e_secs",
"smg_g9i_est_tp_secs",
"smg_g9i_est_td_secs",
"smg_g9i_est_td_slot_secs",
"smg_g9i_shadow_ttft_est_error_seconds",
"smg_g9i_est_vs_actual_residual",
"smg_g9i_bootstrap_actual_secs",
"smg_router_ttft_seconds",
] {
out.push((Matcher::Full(name.to_string()), ttft.clone()));
}
for name in [
"smg_router_tpot_seconds",
"smg_g9i_admit_hold_secs",
"smg_g9i_reservoir_wait_seconds",
"smg_worker_retry_backoff_seconds",
] {
out.push((Matcher::Full(name.to_string()), fine.clone()));
}
out.push((
Matcher::Full("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth".to_string()),
depth,
));
out.push((
Matcher::Full("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_table_evicted_age_seconds".to_string()),
age,
));
out
}
pub fn start_prometheus(config: PrometheusConfig) {
init_metrics();
@@ -351,11 +409,20 @@ pub fn start_prometheus(config: PrometheusConfig) {
.unwrap_or(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0)));
let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr, config.port);
PrometheusBuilder::new()
let mut builder = PrometheusBuilder::new()
.with_http_listener(socket_addr)
.upkeep_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5 * 60))
.set_buckets_for_metric(duration_matcher, &duration_bucket)
.expect("failed to set duration bucket")
.expect("failed to set duration bucket");
// T25b: every remaining gateway histogram gets explicit buckets (see
// histogram_bucket_overrides) — no metric falls back to the broken
// client-side summary path.
for (matcher, buckets) in histogram_bucket_overrides() {
builder = builder
.set_buckets_for_metric(matcher, &buckets)
.expect("failed to set g9i histogram buckets");
}
builder
.install()
.expect("failed to install Prometheus metrics exporter");
}
@@ -1513,4 +1580,61 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(method_to_static_str("POST"), "POST");
assert_eq!(method_to_static_str("UNKNOWN"), "OTHER");
}
/// T25b smoke: with the production bucket overrides applied, g9i
/// histograms render as real Prometheus histograms with non-zero le
/// bucket counts (histogram_quantile-able) — never the client-side
/// summary path that exported all-zero quantiles in v16.
#[test]
fn t25b_g9i_histograms_render_bucketed() {
let mut builder = PrometheusBuilder::new();
for (matcher, buckets) in histogram_bucket_overrides() {
builder = builder
.set_buckets_for_metric(matcher, &buckets)
.expect("bucket override must apply");
}
let recorder = builder.build_recorder();
let handle = recorder.handle();
metrics::with_local_recorder(&recorder, || {
let ttft = histogram!("smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds", "class" => "hot");
for v in [0.8, 1.5, 3.0, 12.0, 45.0] {
ttft.record(v);
}
histogram!("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth").record(7.0);
histogram!("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth").record(120.0);
});
let out = handle.render();
// Real histogram exposition, not summary.
assert!(
out.contains("# TYPE smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds histogram"),
"class ttft renders as histogram:\n{out}"
);
assert!(
!out.contains("smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds{quantile="),
"no summary quantile lines:\n{out}"
);
// 3 of the 5 samples (0.8, 1.5, 3.0) land at or below le=5.
assert!(
out.contains("smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds_bucket{class=\"hot\",le=\"5\"} 3"),
"le=5 bucket counts 3 samples:\n{out}"
);
assert!(
out.contains("smg_g9i_class_ttft_seconds_bucket{class=\"hot\",le=\"+Inf\"} 5"),
"+Inf bucket counts all 5:\n{out}"
);
// lookup_depth: 7 -> le=10; both samples (7, 120) <= 200
// (Prometheus buckets are cumulative).
assert!(
out.contains("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth_bucket{le=\"10\"} 1"),
"depth 7 lands in le=10:\n{out}"
);
assert!(
out.contains("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth_bucket{le=\"200\"} 2"),
"both depths land at or below le=200 (cumulative):\n{out}"
);
assert!(
out.contains("smg_g9i_shadow_prefix_lookup_depth_count 2"),
"count line present:\n{out}"
);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
//! G9i v2 P1 shadow mode — T1: prefix hash chain (pure function layer).
//!
//! Design source: `experiments/g9i/g9i-v2-design-20261013.md` §3.2/§4.1,
//! content-handling constraints C4/C10. This module is **read-only with
//! respect to routing**: it computes hashes, it never touches dispatch.
//!
//! Why a chain: a chat body with `m` messages has exactly `m` prefix
//! boundaries, and the session bookkeeping table ("prefix → last serving
//! node + exact token count") needs a stable key per boundary. Rolling the
//! hash forward per message gives all `m` keys in one pass; lookup then
//! probes from deep to shallow and takes the deepest hit. In practice a new
//! turn is `previous body + assistant reply + new user message`, so hits
//! usually land at `h[m-2]`.
//!
//! seed = xxh3(canonical_json({model, chat_template_kwargs, tools_hash, system}))
//! h[0] = seed
//! h[k] = xxh3(h[k-1] LE bytes ‖ len(role) ‖ role ‖ tagged content
//! ‖ tagged canonical(tool_calls) ‖ tagged meta) k = 1..=m
//!
//! Encoding decisions (why, not what):
//! * Streaming `Xxh3` instead of concatenating into a `Vec`: chat bodies
//! with base64 images are routinely hundreds of KB; copying them per
//! chain step would be pure waste.
//! * Every variable-length field is length-prefixed (u64 LE) and every
//! content piece carries a type tag. Without that, `["ab","c"]` and
//! `["a","bc"]` (or role/content, part/part splits) would hash
//! identically — silent false cache hits.
//! * Missing role defaults to "user" (OpenAI clients routinely omit it);
//! missing `model` / `chat_template_kwargs` / `tools` / system message
//! serialize as JSON `null` in the seed document — a fixed placeholder
//! that cannot collide with any real value because `null` is not a
//! string/object the field could otherwise hold.
//! * Byte-level semantics for multimodal (C4): `image_url` URLs are
//! hashed as the raw string — `http(s):` URLs as-is, `data:` URLs
//! including the base64 payload, **never fetched, never decoded**.
//! Same image at different URLs hashes differently; that is correct —
//! the rendered prompt bytes differ.
//! * `is_unclassifiable` and `chain_hashes` share one traversal
//! (`walk_messages`) so the "weird content" judgement can never drift
//! between the two call sites (C10). Unknown part types still
//! contribute a deterministic tag to the chain — the chain stays
//! well-defined, the caller just must not trust it for table lookups
//! when `is_unclassifiable` is true.
//! * `content: null` / missing renders as empty content in every chat
//! template, so it hashes exactly like `""` — NOT unclassifiable.
//! Flagging it would disenfranchise tool-use conversations (assistant
//! turns with `content: null` + `tool_calls`), our main traffic shape.
//! Genuinely malformed content (number/object/bool) keeps the
//! Empty + unclassifiable treatment.
//! * `tool_calls` are rendered into the prompt by the chat template, so
//! they MUST enter the chain (as canonical JSON, key-order
//! insensitive) — otherwise two conversations with different tool
//! calls could share a hash: a false hit in the dangerous direction.
//! `reasoning_content` is deliberately excluded: templates never
//! render it, so it cannot change prompt bytes.
//! * `tool_call_id` (on `role:"tool"` results) and `name` (any role)
//! are rendered by most templates, so they enter the chain as one
//! canonical meta object. The META segment is unconditional — a
//! message without these fields contributes `TAG_META ‖ len=0`,
//! keeping the formula single-path (no presence/absence ambiguity).
//!
//! T23 (intra-message chunking): a text piece longer than `CHUNK_BYTES`
//! (2048) is first rolled into bare chunk rings `xxh3(prev ‖ chunk)` —
//! no tag, no length prefix — in content order, and the message-final
//! ring then carries only the remaining ≤2048-byte tail in its content
//! segment. Why: a per-message chain is structurally blind inside one
//! long message (one message = one ring, so a shared 100KB prefix with
//! a different tail hits nothing — v13 measured 9034/9034 depth-0
//! misses on single-message long-prompt traffic). Chunk rings give the
//! lookup table mid-message anchors at a fixed granularity. Texts of
//! ≤2048 bytes emit no chunk rings, so short-message chains stay
//! byte-identical to the pre-T23 formula (pinned by
//! `short_messages_match_legacy_chain_byte_for_byte`). Because one
//! message may now own several rings, `chain_hashes_indexed` also
//! returns each ring's message index; `classify` needs it to map a
//! hit's ring position back into the message index space of
//! `msg_bytes` / `msg_image`.
use serde_json::Value;
use xxhash_rust::xxh3::{xxh3_64, Xxh3};
/// Part-type tags mixed in before each content piece. Terminated with `\0`
/// so tags are self-delimiting; content bytes are length-prefixed on top.
const TAG_TEXT: &[u8] = b"text\0";
const TAG_IMAGE_URL: &[u8] = b"image_url\0";
const TAG_UNKNOWN: &[u8] = b"unknown\0";
const TAG_TOOL_CALLS: &[u8] = b"tool_calls\0";
const TAG_META: &[u8] = b"meta\0";
/// T23: intra-message chunk size in bytes. A text piece longer than this
/// contributes `ceil`-style bare chunk rings before its message-final
/// ring (see module docs). 2048 bytes ≈ 500-600 tokens of English/JSON —
/// fine enough to rescue shared-prefix hits, coarse enough that typical
/// multi-turn chats (short messages) never pay the extra hash passes.
const CHUNK_BYTES: usize = 2048;
/// Chain seed: folds every body field that changes the rendered prompt but
/// lives outside `messages` into one u64.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub struct ChainSeed {
pub value: u64,
}
impl ChainSeed {
/// Build the seed from a chat request body.
///
/// Inputs: `model`, `chat_template_kwargs`, `tools` (folded to a single
/// hash of its canonical form), and the first `role=="system"` message's
/// string content. Missing fields become JSON `null` in the seed
/// document (fixed placeholder, see module docs). Canonicalization
/// sorts object keys recursively and emits no whitespace, so semantically
/// equal bodies from different clients produce the same seed.
///
/// Note: a system message is *also* hashed as `messages[0]` inside the
/// chain — deliberately. The chain must stay 1:1 with `messages`
/// indices (the lookup table keys are `h[k]` by position), and the
/// redundancy only costs one extra mix of already-known bytes.
pub fn from_body(body: &Value) -> ChainSeed {
let system_content: Option<&str> = body
.get("messages")
.and_then(Value::as_array)
.and_then(|msgs| {
msgs.iter()
.find(|m| m.get("role").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("system"))
})
.and_then(|m| m.get("content"))
.and_then(Value::as_str);
let tools_hash: Option<u64> = body
.get("tools")
.map(|t| xxh3_64(canonical_json(t).as_bytes()));
let seed_doc = serde_json::json!({
"model": body.get("model").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
"chat_template_kwargs": body
.get("chat_template_kwargs")
.cloned()
.unwrap_or(Value::Null),
"tools_hash": tools_hash,
"system": system_content,
});
ChainSeed {
value: xxh3_64(canonical_json(&seed_doc).as_bytes()),
}
}
}
/// Compute the chain hashes `h[1..=m]`, one ring per message (plus T23
/// intra-message chunk rings), in order.
///
/// `messages` missing / not an array / empty → empty `Vec`. The caller
/// treats an empty chain as "cannot classify" (same fall-back path as
/// `is_unclassifiable`); we never panic on malformed bodies because this
/// sits on the hot request path.
///
/// The returned chain is deterministic even when `is_unclassifiable(body)`
/// is true — unknown parts contribute their tag — but such chains are only
/// suitable for logging/shadow comparison, not for bookkeeping lookups.
///
/// This is the chain-only view of `chain_hashes_indexed`; callers that
/// index into per-message arrays (`msg_bytes`, `msg_image`) need the
/// indexed form to translate ring positions to message indices.
pub fn chain_hashes(seed: &ChainSeed, body: &Value) -> Vec<u64> {
chain_hashes_indexed(seed, body).0
}
/// `chain_hashes` plus, for each ring, the index of the message it
/// belongs to (chunk rings and the message-final ring of message `k`
/// all carry `k`). Both returned vecs always have the same length.
pub fn chain_hashes_indexed(seed: &ChainSeed, body: &Value) -> (Vec<u64>, Vec<usize>) {
let (msgs, _) = walk_messages(body);
let mut chain = Vec::with_capacity(msgs.len());
let mut ring_msg = Vec::with_capacity(msgs.len());
let mut prev = seed.value;
for (mi, msg) in msgs.iter().enumerate() {
// T23 pass 1: roll oversized text pieces into bare chunk rings
// (h = xxh3(prev ‖ chunk), no tag/length) and keep the ≤2048-byte
// tails for the message-final ring. Short texts emit nothing here
// and their tails ARE the originals — the pre-T23 byte stream.
let content = match &msg.content {
ContentView::Str(s) => {
ContentView::Str(roll_chunks(&mut prev, &mut chain, &mut ring_msg, mi, s))
}
ContentView::Parts(parts) => {
let mut viewed = Vec::with_capacity(parts.len());
for part in parts {
viewed.push(match part {
PartView::Text(t) => PartView::Text(roll_chunks(
&mut prev,
&mut chain,
&mut ring_msg,
mi,
t,
)),
PartView::ImageUrl(u) => PartView::ImageUrl(u),
PartView::Unknown => PartView::Unknown,
});
}
ContentView::Parts(viewed)
}
ContentView::Empty => ContentView::Empty,
};
// Pass 2: the message-final ring — the pre-T23 formula unchanged,
// except its content segment now hashes the pass-1 tails.
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&prev.to_le_bytes());
let role = msg.role.as_bytes();
h.update(&(role.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
h.update(role);
match &content {
ContentView::Str(s) => {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TEXT, s.as_bytes());
}
ContentView::Parts(parts) => {
for part in parts {
match part {
PartView::Text(t) => update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TEXT, t.as_bytes()),
PartView::ImageUrl(u) => {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_IMAGE_URL, u.as_bytes())
}
PartView::Unknown => h.update(TAG_UNKNOWN),
}
}
}
ContentView::Empty => {}
}
// Third segment: tool_calls are rendered into prompt bytes by the
// chat template, so they must be in the chain.
if let Some(tc) = &msg.tool_calls {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TOOL_CALLS, tc.as_bytes());
}
// Fourth segment (unconditional): name / tool_call_id meta. Empty
// meta hashes as TAG_META ‖ len=0 — one formula for all messages.
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_META, msg.extra.as_bytes());
prev = h.digest();
chain.push(prev);
ring_msg.push(mi);
}
(chain, ring_msg)
}
/// Roll `prev` forward over `text`'s full chunks, emitting one bare ring
/// per chunk (`xxh3(prev ‖ chunk bytes)`), and return the remaining tail
/// (≤ CHUNK_BYTES, possibly empty) for the message-final ring. Texts of
/// ≤ CHUNK_BYTES emit nothing and are returned untouched.
fn roll_chunks<'a>(
prev: &mut u64,
chain: &mut Vec<u64>,
ring_msg: &mut Vec<usize>,
mi: usize,
text: &'a str,
) -> &'a str {
let mut rest = text;
while rest.len() > CHUNK_BYTES {
let (chunk, tail) = take_chunk(rest);
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&prev.to_le_bytes());
h.update(chunk.as_bytes());
*prev = h.digest();
chain.push(*prev);
ring_msg.push(mi);
rest = tail;
}
rest
}
/// Split off the leading chunk of at most CHUNK_BYTES bytes, backing off
/// to the previous UTF-8 char boundary when the cut lands mid-character.
/// The caller guarantees `s.len() > CHUNK_BYTES`, so the boundary walk
/// can never reach 0 (the first char is at most 4 bytes).
fn take_chunk(s: &str) -> (&str, &str) {
debug_assert!(s.len() > CHUNK_BYTES);
let mut end = CHUNK_BYTES;
while !s.is_char_boundary(end) {
end -= 1;
}
s.split_at(end)
}
/// Whether the body contains content this module has no hashing semantics
/// for: unknown part types (`audio_url`, `video_url`, `file`, ...),
/// malformed parts, unsupported `image_url` schemes, or genuinely
/// malformed message content (number/object/bool). Null/missing content
/// and `tool_calls`-carrying assistant turns return false — both have
/// well-defined rendering semantics. See `walk_messages` — this is the
/// same traversal, so the answer cannot disagree with what `chain_hashes`
/// actually hashed.
pub fn is_unclassifiable(body: &Value) -> bool {
walk_messages(body).1
}
/// Mix `tag ‖ len(bytes) ‖ bytes` into the hasher. Length prefix kills
/// concatenation ambiguity between adjacent pieces.
fn update_tagged(h: &mut Xxh3, tag: &[u8], bytes: &[u8]) {
h.update(tag);
h.update(&(bytes.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
h.update(bytes);
}
/// One message, flattened to just what the hash needs. Borrows from the
/// body — zero copies on the hot path, except `tool_calls` / `extra`
/// whose canonical forms must be owned.
struct MessageView<'a> {
role: &'a str,
content: ContentView<'a>,
/// Canonical JSON of `tool_calls` when the field exists and is an
/// array (a non-array shape can't be rendered by the template either,
/// so it's treated as absent).
tool_calls: Option<String>,
/// Canonical JSON of the meta object {"name"?, "tool_call_id"?}, or
/// empty when neither field applies. See `walk_messages` for which
/// fields qualify per role.
extra: String,
}
enum ContentView<'a> {
Str(&'a str),
Parts(Vec<PartView<'a>>),
/// Genuinely malformed content (number/object/bool): contributes
/// nothing, flagged unclassifiable. Null/missing content never lands
/// here — it maps to `Str("")`.
Empty,
}
enum PartView<'a> {
Text(&'a str),
ImageUrl(&'a str),
/// Unrecognized or malformed part: deterministic placeholder.
Unknown,
}
/// Single traversal shared by `chain_hashes` and `is_unclassifiable`
/// (C10: one source of truth for "what can we hash").
fn walk_messages(body: &Value) -> (Vec<MessageView<'_>>, bool) {
let Some(msgs) = body.get("messages").and_then(Value::as_array) else {
return (Vec::new(), false);
};
let mut unclassifiable = false;
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(msgs.len());
for m in msgs {
let role = m.get("role").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("user");
// `reasoning_content` is deliberately NOT hashed: chat templates do
// not render it, so it cannot change prompt bytes — mixing it in
// would only manufacture misses.
let tool_calls = match m.get("tool_calls") {
Some(v @ Value::Array(_)) => Some(canonical_json(v)),
_ => None,
};
// Meta segment: `name` (any role) and `tool_call_id` (tool results
// only) are rendered by most templates -> they must be in the
// chain. String and non-string values alike go through the
// canonical serializer, so wire-shape differences can't collide.
// Explicit null counts as absent (templates render it as nothing).
let mut meta = serde_json::Map::new();
if let Some(v) = m.get("name").filter(|v| !v.is_null()) {
meta.insert("name".to_string(), v.clone());
}
if role == "tool" {
if let Some(v) = m.get("tool_call_id").filter(|v| !v.is_null()) {
meta.insert("tool_call_id".to_string(), v.clone());
}
}
let extra = if meta.is_empty() {
String::new()
} else {
canonical_json(&Value::Object(meta))
};
let content = match m.get("content") {
Some(Value::String(s)) => ContentView::Str(s.as_str()),
Some(Value::Array(parts)) => {
let mut views = Vec::with_capacity(parts.len());
for p in parts {
match classify_part(p) {
Some(view) => views.push(view),
None => {
unclassifiable = true;
views.push(PartView::Unknown);
}
}
}
ContentView::Parts(views)
}
// null / absent renders as empty content in every chat
// template — hash exactly like "" and stay classifiable. This
// is the tool-use conversation shape (assistant turn with
// content:null + tool_calls), our main traffic.
None | Some(Value::Null) => ContentView::Str(""),
// number/object/bool content: genuinely malformed, no defined
// rendering semantics — fail closed.
_ => {
unclassifiable = true;
ContentView::Empty
}
};
out.push(MessageView {
role,
content,
tool_calls,
extra,
});
}
(out, unclassifiable)
}
/// Classify one content part. `None` = no hashing semantics for this part
/// (unknown type, malformed shape, or an `image_url` scheme outside
/// http/https/data — e.g. `file://` would tempt a local read we must never
/// do).
fn classify_part(p: &Value) -> Option<PartView<'_>> {
let ty = p.get("type").and_then(Value::as_str)?;
match ty {
"text" => p
.get("text")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.map(PartView::Text),
"image_url" => {
// Both wire shapes exist in the wild:
// {"image_url":{"url":...}} and {"image_url":"..."}.
let url = match p.get("image_url") {
Some(Value::String(s)) => Some(s.as_str()),
Some(v @ Value::Object(_)) => v.get("url").and_then(Value::as_str),
_ => None,
}?;
if url.starts_with("http://") || url.starts_with("https://") || url.starts_with("data:")
{
Some(PartView::ImageUrl(url))
} else {
None
}
}
_ => None,
}
}
/// Canonical JSON: object keys sorted recursively, no whitespace. Hand-rolled
/// (no new crate) because we only need it for seed inputs, which are small —
/// `tools` is hashed from its canonical form, and the seed doc itself is
/// four fields.
fn canonical_json(v: &Value) -> String {
let mut out = String::new();
write_canonical(v, &mut out);
out
}
fn write_canonical(v: &Value, out: &mut String) {
match v {
Value::Object(map) => {
out.push('{');
let mut keys: Vec<&String> = map.keys().collect();
keys.sort();
for (i, k) in keys.iter().enumerate() {
if i > 0 {
out.push(',');
}
// Serializing a &str Value is infallible; avoid unwrap anyway.
if let Ok(k_json) = serde_json::to_string(k) {
out.push_str(&k_json);
}
out.push(':');
write_canonical(&map[*k], out);
}
out.push('}');
}
Value::Array(arr) => {
out.push('[');
for (i, item) in arr.iter().enumerate() {
if i > 0 {
out.push(',');
}
write_canonical(item, out);
}
out.push(']');
}
other => {
if let Ok(s) = serde_json::to_string(other) {
out.push_str(&s);
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::json;
fn text_body(msgs: Vec<Value>) -> Value {
json!({"model": "dsv41-flash", "messages": msgs})
}
fn user(t: &str) -> Value {
json!({"role": "user", "content": t})
}
fn assistant(t: &str) -> Value {
json!({"role": "assistant", "content": t})
}
fn chain(body: &Value) -> Vec<u64> {
chain_hashes(&ChainSeed::from_body(body), body)
}
#[test]
fn same_prefix_different_tail() {
let a = text_body(vec![user("hello"), assistant("hi"), user("tail A")]);
let b = text_body(vec![user("hello"), assistant("hi"), user("tail B")]);
let ca = chain(&a);
let cb = chain(&b);
assert_eq!(ca.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(cb.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(ca[..2], cb[..2], "shared prefix must hash identically");
assert_ne!(ca[2], cb[2], "different tail must diverge");
}
#[test]
fn forked_conversation_shares_prefix() {
let base = vec![user("q1"), assistant("a1"), user("q2"), assistant("a2")];
let mut fork_x = base.clone();
fork_x.push(user("branch X"));
let mut fork_y = base;
fork_y.push(user("branch Y"));
let bx = text_body(fork_x);
let by = text_body(fork_y);
let cx = chain(&bx);
let cy = chain(&by);
assert_eq!(cx[..4], cy[..4]);
assert_ne!(cx[4], cy[4]);
}
#[test]
fn editing_history_rewrites_from_that_point_on() {
let a = text_body(vec![user("q1"), assistant("old answer"), user("q2")]);
let b = text_body(vec![user("q1"), assistant("edited answer"), user("q2")]);
let ca = chain(&a);
let cb = chain(&b);
assert_eq!(ca[0], cb[0], "before the edit: unchanged");
assert_ne!(ca[1], cb[1], "at the edit: changed");
assert_ne!(ca[2], cb[2], "after the edit: still changed even with identical text");
}
#[test]
fn multimodal_byte_level_semantics() {
let mk = |url: &str| {
text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "what is in this image?"},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": url}}
]
})])
};
// Same image content, different URLs -> different chain (the rendered
// prompt bytes differ; this is the correct byte-level behaviour).
let http_a = mk("https://example.com/a.png");
let http_b = mk("https://example.com/b.png");
assert_ne!(chain(&http_a), chain(&http_b));
// Identical base64 payload -> identical chain (hit).
let data_1 = mk("");
let data_2 = mk("");
assert_eq!(chain(&data_1), chain(&data_2));
// base64 vs http form of the "same" image -> different (bytes differ).
assert_ne!(chain(&data_1), chain(&http_a));
// Wire-shape variant {"image_url":"..."} hashes like the object form.
let flat = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "what is in this image?"},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": "https://example.com/a.png"}
]
})]);
assert_eq!(chain(&flat), chain(&http_a));
}
#[test]
fn seed_fields_change_whole_chain() {
let msgs = || vec![user("same"), assistant("same")];
let base = text_body(msgs());
let other_model = json!({"model": "other-model", "messages": msgs()});
let with_kwargs = json!({
"model": "dsv41-flash",
"chat_template_kwargs": {"thinking": true},
"messages": msgs()
});
let with_tools = json!({
"model": "dsv41-flash",
"tools": [{"type": "function", "function": {"name": "f"}}],
"messages": msgs()
});
let c_base = chain(&base);
assert_ne!(ChainSeed::from_body(&base), ChainSeed::from_body(&other_model));
assert_ne!(chain(&other_model), c_base);
assert_ne!(chain(&with_kwargs), c_base);
assert_ne!(chain(&with_tools), c_base);
}
#[test]
fn seed_canonicalization_is_key_order_insensitive() {
let a = json!({"model": "m", "chat_template_kwargs": {"x": 1, "y": 2}, "messages": [user("hi")]});
let b = json!({"messages": [user("hi")], "chat_template_kwargs": {"y": 2, "x": 1}, "model": "m"});
assert_eq!(ChainSeed::from_body(&a), ChainSeed::from_body(&b));
assert_eq!(chain(&a), chain(&b));
}
#[test]
fn missing_or_malformed_messages_give_empty_chain() {
let no_messages = json!({"model": "m"});
let empty_messages = json!({"model": "m", "messages": []});
let wrong_type = json!({"model": "m", "messages": "not-an-array"});
for b in [&no_messages, &empty_messages, &wrong_type] {
assert!(chain(b).is_empty());
}
}
#[test]
fn unknown_part_types_flag_unclassifiable() {
let audio = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [{"type": "audio_url", "audio_url": {"url": "https://x/a.mp3"}}]
})]);
assert!(is_unclassifiable(&audio));
// Chain is still full-length and deterministic — just not to be trusted.
assert_eq!(chain(&audio).len(), 1);
assert_eq!(chain(&audio), chain(&audio));
let file_scheme = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "file:///etc/passwd"}}]
})]);
assert!(is_unclassifiable(&file_scheme));
let plain = text_body(vec![user("hello"), assistant("hi")]);
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&plain));
let multimodal_ok = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "look"},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "https://x/a.png"}}
]
})]);
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&multimodal_ok));
}
#[test]
fn missing_role_defaults_to_user() {
let implicit = text_body(vec![json!({"content": "hi"})]);
let explicit = text_body(vec![user("hi")]);
assert_eq!(chain(&implicit), chain(&explicit));
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&implicit));
}
fn tool_call(name: &str, args: &str) -> Value {
json!([{
"id": format!("call_{}", name),
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": name, "arguments": args}
}])
}
#[test]
fn tool_calls_enter_the_chain() {
let mk = |tc: Value| {
text_body(vec![
user("weather in Shanghai?"),
json!({"role": "assistant", "content": null, "tool_calls": tc}),
user("and tomorrow?"),
])
};
let a = mk(tool_call("get_weather", "{\"city\":\"sh\"}"));
let b = mk(tool_call("get_weather", "{\"city\":\"bj\"}"));
let c = mk(tool_call("get_weather", "{\"city\":\"sh\"}"));
let (ca, cb, cc) = (chain(&a), chain(&b), chain(&c));
assert_eq!(ca[0], cb[0], "before the tool call: unchanged");
assert_ne!(ca[1], cb[1], "different tool_calls must diverge");
assert_ne!(ca[2], cb[2], "and stay diverged afterwards");
assert_eq!(ca, cc, "identical tool_calls must hit");
}
#[test]
fn content_null_with_tool_calls_is_classifiable() {
let tc = tool_call("get_weather", "{}");
let null_content = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "assistant", "content": null, "tool_calls": tc.clone()
})]);
let empty_content = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "assistant", "content": "", "tool_calls": tc
})]);
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&null_content));
assert_eq!(
chain(&null_content),
chain(&empty_content),
"content:null renders as empty -> must hash like content:\"\""
);
}
#[test]
fn content_null_without_tool_calls_is_empty() {
let null_content = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "assistant", "content": null})]);
let missing_content = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "assistant"})]);
let empty_content = text_body(vec![assistant("")]);
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&null_content));
assert!(!is_unclassifiable(&missing_content));
assert_eq!(chain(&null_content), chain(&empty_content));
assert_eq!(chain(&missing_content), chain(&empty_content));
// Genuinely malformed content types keep the fail-closed treatment.
let malformed = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "assistant", "content": 42})]);
assert!(is_unclassifiable(&malformed));
}
#[test]
fn tool_calls_canonicalization_key_order_insensitive() {
let a = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "assistant",
"content": null,
"tool_calls": [{
"id": "call_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": "f", "arguments": "{}"}
}]
})]);
let b = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "assistant",
"content": null,
"tool_calls": [{
"function": {"arguments": "{}", "name": "f"},
"type": "function",
"id": "call_1"
}]
})]);
assert_eq!(chain(&a), chain(&b));
}
#[test]
fn tool_call_id_enters_chain() {
let mk = |id: &str| {
text_body(vec![
user("weather in Shanghai?"),
json!({
"role": "assistant",
"content": null,
"tool_calls": tool_call("get_weather", "{}")
}),
json!({"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": id, "content": "sunny"}),
user("thanks"),
])
};
let a = mk("call_1");
let b = mk("call_2");
let c = mk("call_1");
let (ca, cb, cc) = (chain(&a), chain(&b), chain(&c));
assert_eq!(ca[..2], cb[..2], "before the tool result: unchanged");
assert_ne!(ca[2], cb[2], "different tool_call_id must diverge");
assert_ne!(ca[3], cb[3], "and stay diverged afterwards");
assert_eq!(ca, cc, "identical tool_call_id must hit");
}
#[test]
fn name_field_enters_chain() {
let a = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "user", "name": "alice", "content": "hi"})]);
let b = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "user", "name": "bob", "content": "hi"})]);
let c = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "user", "name": "alice", "content": "hi"})]);
assert_ne!(chain(&a), chain(&b), "different name must diverge");
assert_eq!(chain(&a), chain(&c), "identical name must hit");
// Absent name and empty meta stay equivalent to a plain message.
let plain = text_body(vec![user("hi")]);
let no_name = text_body(vec![json!({"role": "user", "content": "hi"})]);
assert_eq!(chain(&plain), chain(&no_name));
}
/// `reasoning_content` must NOT change the chain: chat templates do not
/// render historical reasoning into the prompt, so hashing it would
/// manufacture misses for thinking-enabled clients that echo it back.
/// Pins the walk_messages assumption (thinking:true is our default).
#[test]
fn reasoning_content_does_not_enter_chain() {
let plain = text_body(vec![user("q"), assistant("a"), user("q2")]);
let with_reasoning = text_body(vec![
user("q"),
json!({"role": "assistant", "content": "a", "reasoning_content": "let me think..."}),
user("q2"),
]);
assert_eq!(
chain(&plain),
chain(&with_reasoning),
"reasoning_content is not rendered -> must not change the chain"
);
assert!(
!is_unclassifiable(&with_reasoning),
"reasoning-carrying turns stay classifiable"
);
}
// ==================== T23: intra-message chunking ====================
/// The pre-T23 `chain_hashes`, verbatim copy. Short-message bodies must
/// produce byte-identical chains under the chunked implementation.
fn legacy_chain_hashes(seed: &ChainSeed, body: &Value) -> Vec<u64> {
let (msgs, _) = walk_messages(body);
let mut chain = Vec::with_capacity(msgs.len());
let mut prev = seed.value;
for msg in &msgs {
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&prev.to_le_bytes());
let role = msg.role.as_bytes();
h.update(&(role.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
h.update(role);
match &msg.content {
ContentView::Str(s) => {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TEXT, s.as_bytes());
}
ContentView::Parts(parts) => {
for part in parts {
match part {
PartView::Text(t) => update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TEXT, t.as_bytes()),
PartView::ImageUrl(u) => {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_IMAGE_URL, u.as_bytes())
}
PartView::Unknown => h.update(TAG_UNKNOWN),
}
}
}
ContentView::Empty => {}
}
if let Some(tc) = &msg.tool_calls {
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_TOOL_CALLS, tc.as_bytes());
}
update_tagged(&mut h, TAG_META, msg.extra.as_bytes());
prev = h.digest();
chain.push(prev);
}
chain
}
#[test]
fn short_messages_match_legacy_chain_byte_for_byte() {
let exact_boundary = "x".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES);
let bodies = vec![
// pure-text multi-turn
text_body(vec![user("q1"), assistant("a1"), user("q2")]),
// multimodal parts (short text + image)
text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "look"},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "https://x/a.png"}}
]
})]),
// tool_calls + content:null + tool result (meta on both)
text_body(vec![
user("weather?"),
json!({"role": "assistant", "content": null,
"tool_calls": tool_call("get_weather", "{\"city\":\"sh\"}")}),
json!({"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_1", "content": "sunny"}),
]),
// name meta
text_body(vec![json!({"role": "user", "name": "alice", "content": "hi"})]),
// null content without tool_calls
text_body(vec![json!({"role": "assistant", "content": null})]),
// exactly CHUNK_BYTES: never splits (only > CHUNK_BYTES does)
text_body(vec![user(&exact_boundary)]),
];
for b in &bodies {
let seed = ChainSeed::from_body(b);
assert_eq!(
chain_hashes(&seed, b),
legacy_chain_hashes(&seed, b),
"short-message chain must stay byte-identical to pre-T23"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn long_message_splits_into_chunk_rings() {
// CHUNK_BYTES + 1 -> one chunk ring + the message-final ring.
let text = "x".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES + 1);
let body = text_body(vec![user(&text)]);
let seed = ChainSeed::from_body(&body);
let (c, idx) = chain_hashes_indexed(&seed, &body);
assert_eq!(c.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(idx, vec![0, 0], "both rings belong to message 0");
// The chunk ring is bare: xxh3(prev_le ‖ chunk), no tag, no length.
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&seed.value.to_le_bytes());
h.update("x".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES).as_bytes());
assert_eq!(c[0], h.digest());
// Exactly CHUNK_BYTES -> single ring (only > CHUNK_BYTES splits);
// already pinned by the legacy-equivalence battery above.
assert_eq!(chain(&text_body(vec![user(&"y".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES))])).len(), 1);
}
/// The T23 acceptance shape: two single-message bodies sharing a 4KB
/// prefix but differing in the tail now share their chunk rings — the
/// pre-T23 chain (one ring per message) could never hit here.
#[test]
fn shared_long_prefix_different_tail_shares_chunk_rings() {
let prefix = "a".repeat(2 * CHUNK_BYTES);
let a = text_body(vec![user(&format!("{prefix}{}", "b".repeat(100)))]);
let b = text_body(vec![user(&format!("{prefix}{}", "c".repeat(200)))]);
let (ca, ia) = chain_hashes_indexed(&ChainSeed::from_body(&a), &a);
let (cb, ib) = chain_hashes_indexed(&ChainSeed::from_body(&b), &b);
assert_eq!(ca.len(), 3, "2 chunk rings + message-final ring");
assert_eq!(cb.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(ia, vec![0, 0, 0]);
assert_eq!(ib, vec![0, 0, 0]);
assert_eq!(
ca[..2],
cb[..2],
"identical 4KB prefix -> identical chunk rings"
);
assert_ne!(ca[2], cb[2], "different tail -> final ring diverges");
}
#[test]
fn utf8_boundary_chunk_never_splits_a_character() {
// 700 x 3 bytes = 2100 > 2048; the 2048 cut lands mid-汉
// (2048 % 3 = 2), so the chunk must back off to 2046 bytes.
let text = "汉".repeat(700);
let (chunk, tail) = take_chunk(&text);
assert_eq!(chunk.len(), 2046);
assert_eq!(tail.len(), 54);
assert_eq!(format!("{chunk}{tail}"), text, "chunk + tail reconstruct");
let body = text_body(vec![user(&text)]);
let seed = ChainSeed::from_body(&body);
let (c, idx) = chain_hashes_indexed(&seed, &body);
assert_eq!(c.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(idx, vec![0, 0]);
// The chunk ring carries exactly the boundary-aligned bytes.
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&seed.value.to_le_bytes());
h.update(chunk.as_bytes());
assert_eq!(c[0], h.digest());
}
#[test]
fn multi_part_long_text_chunks_per_part_in_order() {
let t1 = "p".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES + 10); // 1 chunk + 10-byte tail
let t2 = "q".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES + 20); // 1 chunk + 20-byte tail
let body = text_body(vec![json!({
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": t1},
{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "https://x/a.png"}},
{"type": "text", "text": t2}
]
})]);
let seed = ChainSeed::from_body(&body);
let (c, idx) = chain_hashes_indexed(&seed, &body);
assert_eq!(c.len(), 3, "t1 chunk + t2 chunk + message-final ring");
assert_eq!(idx, vec![0, 0, 0]);
// Chunk rings follow part order: t1's chunk first, then t2's.
let mut h = Xxh3::new();
h.update(&seed.value.to_le_bytes());
h.update("p".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES).as_bytes());
assert_eq!(c[0], h.digest());
let mut h2 = Xxh3::new();
h2.update(&c[0].to_le_bytes());
h2.update("q".repeat(CHUNK_BYTES).as_bytes());
assert_eq!(c[1], h2.digest());
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
//! HTTP router implementations
pub mod g9i;
pub mod g9i_prefix_chain;
pub mod g9i_shadow;
pub mod pd_router;
pub mod pd_types;
pub mod router;
+577 -11
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ use serde_json::{json, Value};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::UnboundedReceiverStream;
use tracing::{debug, error, warn};
use super::g9i_shadow::{ShadowRequestContext, ShadowResponseContext};
use super::pd_types::api_path;
use crate::{
config::types::RetryConfig,
@@ -58,6 +59,8 @@ pub struct PDRouter {
pub retry_config: RetryConfig,
pub api_key: Option<String>,
pub enable_igw: bool,
/// G9i pool admission + fast-P routing state; None = feature off.
pub g9i: Option<Arc<super::g9i::G9iState>>,
}
struct PreparedWorkerRequest<'a> {
@@ -182,6 +185,14 @@ impl PDRouter {
}
pub async fn new(ctx: &Arc<crate::app_context::AppContext>) -> Result<Self, String> {
let g9i = match &ctx.router_config.g9i {
Some(config) if config.enabled => {
let state = Arc::new(super::g9i::G9iState::new(config.clone()));
state.start_monitor(Arc::clone(&ctx.worker_registry), ctx.client.clone());
Some(state)
}
_ => None,
};
Ok(PDRouter {
worker_registry: Arc::clone(&ctx.worker_registry),
policy_registry: Arc::clone(&ctx.policy_registry),
@@ -189,6 +200,7 @@ impl PDRouter {
retry_config: ctx.router_config.effective_retry_config(),
api_key: ctx.router_config.api_key.clone(),
enable_igw: ctx.router_config.enable_igw,
g9i,
})
}
@@ -366,6 +378,92 @@ impl PDRouter {
Ok((prefill_request, decode_request))
}
/// G9i admission + shadow booking, ONE attempt (T15: the caller retries
/// holdable rejections through the hold queue). None = G9i not
/// configured ("untracked"). Err = rejected (the caller counts +
/// answers 429); the rejections are structured so that a rejected
/// attempt never entered the shadow bookkeeping (T11 拒绝路径零记账).
/// T25-A: `prior_wait_secs` is the time the request already spent
/// parked in the reservoir across re-runs — it counts into TTFT, so
/// the re-judged est_TTFT carries it.
async fn g9i_admission<T: Serialize + Clone>(
&self,
context: &PDRequestContext<'_>,
original_request: &T,
prior_wait_secs: f64,
) -> Option<Result<(Option<String>, &'static str, Option<ShadowRequestContext>), super::g9i::RejectInfo>>
{
let g9i = self.g9i.as_ref()?;
if let Err(info) = g9i.check_decode_pool(&self.worker_registry).await {
return Some(Err(info));
}
if context.route != "/v1/chat/completions" {
// Non-chat routes skip classification but still land on
// the regular pool — the regular queue gate applies.
if let Err(info) = g9i.check_regular_queue(&self.worker_registry) {
return Some(Err(info));
}
return Some(Ok((None, "non_chat", None)));
}
let body = match serde_json::to_value(original_request) {
Ok(body) => body,
Err(_) => return Some(Ok((None, "regular", None))),
};
// Shadow T2: compute the prefix chain once, here, alongside the v1
// classification. Skipped entirely when shadow mode is off.
let shadow_ctx = if g9i.shadow_enabled() {
ShadowRequestContext::from_body(&body, context.is_stream)
} else {
None
};
let (plan, path, probe_new_work) = g9i
.classify_prefill(&self.worker_registry, &self.client, &body)
.await;
// T11: v1 rejection FIRST — a request rejected by any gate must
// never enter the shadow bookkeeping (拒绝路径零记账).
let v1_override = match plan.into_override() {
Ok(o) => o,
Err(info) => return Some(Err(info)),
};
let shadow_ctx = match shadow_ctx {
Some(mut ctx) => {
// T11: classify + candidate pick + cap verdict + admission
// in ONE queue-model critical section (atomic
// check-and-act) — the check→act window no longer spans
// the TTFT wait. Err = p_queue_cap (enforce), nothing
// admitted.
match g9i.shadow_classify_and_admit(&mut ctx) {
Ok(Some(mut decision)) => {
// T25-A: time already parked in the reservoir counts
// into TTFT — the re-judged estimate carries it.
if prior_wait_secs > 0.0 {
decision.est_ttft_secs += prior_wait_secs;
ctx.decision = Some(decision.clone());
}
super::g9i_shadow::record_agreement(
path,
probe_new_work,
&ctx,
&decision,
);
}
Ok(None) => {}
Err(info) => return Some(Err(info)),
}
Some(ctx)
}
None => None,
};
// T7 shadow-consistent routing (--g9i-shadow-route): the live
// prefill override follows the shadow decision's matched_node (=
// the booked node), so est vs actual is pure estimation error.
let override_url = g9i.shadow_route_pick(
v1_override,
shadow_ctx.as_ref().and_then(|c| c.decision.as_ref()),
);
Some(Ok((override_url, path, shadow_ctx)))
}
async fn execute_dual_dispatch<T: Serialize + Clone>(
&self,
headers: Option<&HeaderMap>,
@@ -390,6 +488,138 @@ impl PDRouter {
// Clone request once outside the retry loop, then use Arc to share across attempts
// This avoids O(retries) clones by sharing the same data
let shared_request = Arc::new(original_request.clone());
// G9i admission (router-side, zero engine changes). Computed once per
// request, outside the retry loop: our own 429s must never be
// retried. `ttft_path` labels the TTFT histogram dimension for this
// request's eventual first-token sample. `shadow_ctx` is the G9i v2
// shadow bookkeeping carrier (T2): Some only for chat requests with
// a classifiable prefix chain while shadow mode is on; it never
// influences routing.
//
// T15: holdable rejections (d_window_full / p_queue_cap) park the
// request in the FIFO hold queue instead of an immediate 429
// (429 太伤吞吐 — 测试端把 429 当失败). On pass the COMPLETE
// admission re-runs (every gate re-checked; the T11 booking happens
// only on a passing attempt — a parked request occupies no ledger).
// T20 (B): prompt_too_long hard validation — the FRONT-MOST check,
// before any admission gate / est_TTFT / ledger / queue bookkeeping
// and before the hold loop (an invalid request must never park).
// 400 (client bug), counted in smg_g9i_invalid_request_total, never
// in smg_g9i_rejects_total. Chat-completions only.
if context.route == "/v1/chat/completions" {
if let Some(g9i) = &self.g9i {
if let Ok(body) = serde_json::to_value(original_request) {
if let Some(resp) = g9i.prompt_too_long_rejection(&body) {
return resp;
}
}
}
}
let mut hold_deadline: Option<Instant> = None;
// T25-A reservoir park state: (deadline, seq id) across re-runs +
// the accumulated wait (counts into the est_TTFT re-judgment).
let mut reservoir_state: Option<(Instant, u64)> = None;
let mut reservoir_waited_secs: f64 = 0.0;
let (g9i_prefill_override, g9i_ttft_path, shadow_ctx): (
Option<String>,
&'static str,
Option<ShadowRequestContext>,
) = loop {
match self
.g9i_admission(&context, original_request, reservoir_waited_secs)
.await
{
None => {
// T25: per-request admission outcome (untracked = no
// G9i configured — class "none").
metrics::counter!(
super::g9i::METRIC_ADMISSION_TOTAL,
"class" => "none",
"result" => "admitted",
"reason" => "none",
)
.increment(1);
break (None, "untracked", None);
}
Some(Ok(outcome)) => {
// T25: per-request admission outcome — the shadow
// decision's class (the experiment's primary counter).
let class = outcome
.2
.as_ref()
.and_then(|c| c.decision.as_ref())
.map(|d| d.class.as_str())
.unwrap_or("none");
metrics::counter!(
super::g9i::METRIC_ADMISSION_TOTAL,
"class" => class,
"result" => "admitted",
"reason" => "none",
)
.increment(1);
break outcome;
}
Some(Err(mut info)) => {
let mut retry = false;
if let Some(g9i) = &self.g9i {
// T25-A: under hot_policy=reservoir, HOT-class
// holdable rejections park in the priority
// reservoir INSTEAD of the T15 hold (the A/B stays
// clean — every other class keeps the hold path).
if g9i.reservoir_eligible(&info) {
match g9i
.reservoir_or_reject(&info, &mut reservoir_state)
.await
{
Ok(waited) => {
reservoir_waited_secs += waited;
retry = true;
}
Err(final_info) => info = final_info,
}
} else if info.holdable() {
let body_bytes = context
.request_text
.as_deref()
.map(|s| s.len() as u64)
.unwrap_or(0);
match g9i
.hold_or_reject(&info, body_bytes, &mut hold_deadline)
.await
{
Ok(()) => retry = true,
Err(final_info) => info = final_info,
}
}
}
if retry {
continue;
}
// T25: per-request rejection outcome (class from the
// rejecting gate; "none" on non-chat/early gates).
metrics::counter!(
super::g9i::METRIC_ADMISSION_TOTAL,
"class" => info.hold_class.unwrap_or("none"),
"result" => "rejected",
"reason" => info.reason,
)
.increment(1);
metrics::counter!("smg_g9i_rejects_total", "reason" => info.reason)
.increment(1);
return super::g9i::reject_response(&info);
}
}
};
// T11: handle of the decision-time booking, extracted before the
// retry closure moves `shadow_ctx`. If the dispatch never reached
// the response path (all attempts failed before headers), the
// booking is released after the loop — exactly once, paired with
// shadow_admit's consume mark.
let admission_mark = shadow_ctx.as_ref().and_then(|c| c.admission.clone());
let response = RetryExecutor::execute_response_with_retry(
&self.retry_config,
{
@@ -397,6 +627,8 @@ impl PDRouter {
// Clone Arc (cheap reference count increment) instead of cloning the entire request
let shared_request = Arc::clone(&shared_request);
let context = context.clone();
let g9i_prefill_override = g9i_prefill_override.clone();
let shadow_ctx = shadow_ctx.clone();
async move {
let (prefill, decode) = match self
.select_pd_pair(
@@ -412,6 +644,38 @@ impl PDRouter {
}
};
// G9i least-wait override: route onto the classified
// fast-P node instead of the policy pick.
let (prefill, decode) =
if let Some(override_url) = g9i_prefill_override.as_ref() {
let matched = self
.worker_registry
.get_prefill_workers()
.into_iter()
.find(|w| {
w.url().trim_end_matches('/') == override_url.as_str()
&& w.is_available()
});
match matched {
Some(w) => {
debug!(
"G9i: overriding prefill selection with {}",
override_url
);
(w, decode)
}
None => {
warn!(
"G9i: override target {} unavailable, keeping policy pick",
override_url
);
(prefill, decode)
}
}
} else {
(prefill, decode)
};
debug!(
"PD retry attempt {} using prefill={} decode={}",
attempt,
@@ -428,6 +692,15 @@ impl PDRouter {
json_request["stream"] = Value::Bool(context.is_stream);
}
// G9i shadow T2: inject the usage / cache-details
// flags the client didn't set (chat + shadow mode
// only; `shadow_ctx` is None otherwise). Paired with
// response-side stripping: we inject exactly what we
// later strip, so clients see no change.
if let Some(sctx) = &shadow_ctx {
sctx.inject(&mut json_request);
}
json_request = match Self::inject_bootstrap_into_value(
json_request,
prefill.as_ref(),
@@ -446,6 +719,8 @@ impl PDRouter {
Arc::clone(&prefill),
Arc::clone(&decode),
start_time,
g9i_ttft_path,
shadow_ctx,
)
.await;
@@ -524,6 +799,13 @@ impl PDRouter {
);
}
// T11: release a decision-time booking that no response path ever
// consumed (all attempts failed before headers). No-op when the
// stream/non-stream path already took it over.
if let Some(g9i) = &self.g9i {
g9i.shadow_release_unconsumed(admission_mark);
}
response
}
@@ -575,6 +857,9 @@ impl PDRouter {
Some(response_headers),
prefill,
decode,
None,
// Error envelope: no usage will ever arrive — no shadow hook.
None,
)
} else {
// Handle non-streaming error response
@@ -649,6 +934,7 @@ impl PDRouter {
}
// Internal method that performs the actual dual dispatch (without retry logic)
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn execute_dual_dispatch_internal(
&self,
headers: Option<&HeaderMap>,
@@ -656,7 +942,11 @@ impl PDRouter {
context: PDRequestContext<'_>,
prefill: Arc<dyn Worker>,
decode: Arc<dyn Worker>,
_start_time: Instant,
start_time: Instant,
g9i_path: &'static str,
// G9i shadow T2: prefix chain + injection flags; None = shadow off
// or unclassifiable request — zero behavior change.
shadow_ctx: Option<ShadowRequestContext>,
) -> Response {
// For non-streaming: use guard for automatic load management
// For streaming: load will be managed in create_streaming_response
@@ -868,6 +1158,24 @@ impl PDRouter {
let response_headers = header_utils::preserve_response_headers(res.headers());
// Shadow T2: hand the chain + the ACTUAL prefill landing
// node (post-override) to the stream wrapper, which
// harvests the usage event and strips injected fields.
let shadow = shadow_ctx.map(|ctx| {
ShadowResponseContext::from_request(
ctx,
super::g9i::normalize_url(prefill.url()),
super::g9i::normalize_url(decode.url()),
)
});
// Shadow T3: admit into the queue model keyed by the
// ACTUAL landing node; the stream wrapper pairs this with
// exactly one complete (usage recorded) or release
// (abort/disconnect/error) before teardown.
if let (Some(g9i), Some(s)) = (&self.g9i, &shadow) {
g9i.shadow_admit(s);
}
self.create_streaming_response(
res.bytes_stream(),
status,
@@ -876,17 +1184,41 @@ impl PDRouter {
Some(response_headers),
prefill,
decode,
Some((start_time, g9i_path)),
shadow,
)
} else {
// Non-streaming response
if context.return_logprob {
self.process_non_streaming_response(
res,
status,
context.return_logprob,
prefill_body,
let shadow = shadow_ctx.map(|ctx| {
ShadowResponseContext::from_request(
ctx,
super::g9i::normalize_url(prefill.url()),
super::g9i::normalize_url(decode.url()),
)
.await
});
// Shadow T3: admit into the queue model keyed by the
// ACTUAL landing node; paired with complete/release in
// shadow_record_non_stream (or the read-failure paths
// below / in process_non_streaming_response).
if let (Some(g9i), Some(s)) = (&self.g9i, &shadow) {
g9i.shadow_admit(s);
}
if context.return_logprob {
let resp = self
.process_non_streaming_response(
res,
status,
context.return_logprob,
prefill_body,
shadow,
)
.await;
// T17: non-streaming e2e (observability only — the
// AIMD blind state reads local signals instead).
if let Some(g9i) = &self.g9i {
g9i.record_nonstream_e2e(start_time.elapsed().as_secs_f64());
}
resp
} else {
// Direct passthrough when no logprobs needed
let response_headers =
@@ -894,13 +1226,26 @@ impl PDRouter {
match res.bytes().await {
Ok(decode_body) => {
let mut response = Response::new(Body::from(decode_body));
*response.status_mut() = status;
*response.headers_mut() = response_headers;
let decode_body =
self.shadow_record_non_stream(decode_body, status, &shadow);
let response = Self::non_stream_passthrough_response(
status,
decode_body,
response_headers,
);
// T17: non-streaming e2e (observability only).
if let Some(g9i) = &self.g9i {
g9i.record_nonstream_e2e(start_time.elapsed().as_secs_f64());
}
response
}
Err(e) => {
error!("Failed to read decode response: {}", e);
// Shadow T3: the admitted dispatch produced no
// readable body — release the queue slot.
if let (Some(g9i), Some(s)) = (&self.g9i, &shadow) {
g9i.shadow_release(s);
}
error::internal_error(
"read_response_failed",
"Failed to read response",
@@ -1116,11 +1461,39 @@ impl PDRouter {
headers: Option<HeaderMap>,
prefill: Arc<dyn Worker>,
decode: Arc<dyn Worker>,
// TTFT sampling hook: Some((dispatch-entry instant, path label)) for
// real upstream streams; None for synthetic error envelopes (their
// "first chunk" is not a token — sampling them would poison the
// window with near-zero error samples) and for tests.
ttft: Option<(Instant, &'static str)>,
// G9i shadow T2 hook: Some only for shadowable chat requests on a
// success-status stream; None on error envelopes and tests.
shadow: Option<ShadowResponseContext>,
) -> Response {
use crate::core::AttachedBody;
let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
// G9i TTFT sample: record on the first upstream chunk — that moment is
// the request's time-to-first-token as seen by the gateway (dispatch
// entry -> first token). Non-streaming requests have no observable
// first-token moment and are not sampled.
let g9i_ttft = self.g9i.clone().zip(ttft);
let mut ttft_recorded = false;
// G9i shadow T2: zip the state handle with the per-request context
// (chain + node + strip flags) for the stream loop below.
let g9i_shadow = self.g9i.clone().zip(shadow);
// Shadow T3 queue bookkeeping state. `ttft` is Option<(Instant,
// &'static str)> which is Copy, so zip() above left it usable:
// mirror the dispatch-entry instant so the first chunk can also feed
// the shadow TTFT calibration. `shadow_done` latches once usage is
// recorded; teardown releases the admission only when no completion
// happened (abort / client disconnect / upstream error).
let ttft_start = ttft.map(|(t, _)| t);
let mut shadow_ttft_secs: Option<f64> = None;
let mut shadow_done = false;
// Uses select! to race stream.next() against tx.closed() so that
// when the client disconnects the upstream HTTP connection is dropped
// promptly, allowing the engine to abort the request.
@@ -1149,8 +1522,81 @@ impl PDRouter {
chunk_result = tracked.next() => {
match chunk_result {
Some(Ok(chunk)) => {
// G9i shadow T2: harvest the usage event for
// prefix-table bookkeeping and strip exactly
// the fields we injected on the way in.
// Chunks without a usage field pass through
// byte-identically. A chunk reduced to nothing
// (usage-only event we must hide from the
// client) is dropped entirely.
let chunk = if let Some((g9i, sctx)) = &g9i_shadow {
let (usage, forward) =
super::g9i_shadow::process_sse_chunk(
&chunk,
sctx.strip_usage,
sctx.strip_cached_details,
);
if let Some(json) = usage {
// Shadow T3: exactly one completion
// per admission — the latch keeps a
// (malformed) repeat usage event from
// double-completing the queue slot.
if !shadow_done {
// Streaming harvests the usage
// event pre-strip, so the
// breakdown extraction inside
// works unaided (None).
g9i.shadow_record(sctx, &json, shadow_ttft_secs, None);
shadow_done = true;
}
}
match forward {
Some(bytes) => bytes,
None => continue,
}
} else {
chunk
};
let is_done = memmem::find(&chunk, b"data: [DONE]").is_some();
if !ttft_recorded {
ttft_recorded = true;
if let Some((g9i, (start_time, g9i_path))) = &g9i_ttft {
g9i.record_ttft(
g9i_path,
start_time.elapsed().as_secs_f64(),
);
// T25: TTFT by shadow class — the
// same gateway-observed first-token
// moment (start_time predates the
// admission loop, so reservoir /
// hold waits are included).
if let Some((_, sctx)) = &g9i_shadow {
if let Some(class) =
sctx.class.map(|c| c.as_str())
{
metrics::histogram!(
super::g9i::METRIC_CLASS_TTFT,
"class" => class,
)
.record(start_time.elapsed().as_secs_f64());
}
}
}
// Shadow T3: the same first-token moment
// calibrates est_TTFT (est − actual).
shadow_ttft_secs =
ttft_start.map(|t| t.elapsed().as_secs_f64());
// T16: first token -> the D booking moves
// from the pipeline to the streaming
// sub-ledger (the window gates pipeline
// depth only).
if let Some((g9i, sctx)) = &g9i_shadow {
g9i.shadow_promote_streaming(sctx);
}
}
let result = if return_logprob && prefill_logprobs.is_some() {
Self::merge_streaming_logprobs(prefill_logprobs.clone(), &chunk)
.unwrap_or(chunk)
@@ -1199,6 +1645,15 @@ impl PDRouter {
}
}
}
// Shadow T3: the stream ended without a recorded usage event
// (abort, client disconnect, or upstream error) — release the
// queue admission so outstanding stays conserved. No-op when the
// usage event already completed it.
if !shadow_done {
if let Some((g9i, sctx)) = &g9i_shadow {
g9i.shadow_release(sctx);
}
}
});
let stream = UnboundedReceiverStream::new(rx);
@@ -1226,16 +1681,26 @@ impl PDRouter {
status: StatusCode,
return_logprob: bool,
prefill_body: Option<bytes::Bytes>,
shadow: Option<ShadowResponseContext>,
) -> Response {
let response = res.bytes().await;
let decode_body = match response {
Ok(decode_body) => decode_body,
Err(e) => {
error!("Failed to read decode response: {}", e);
// Shadow T3: the admitted dispatch produced no readable
// body — release the queue slot.
if let (Some(g9i), Some(s)) = (&self.g9i, &shadow) {
g9i.shadow_release(s);
}
return error::internal_error("read_response_failed", "Failed to read response");
}
};
// Shadow T2: record usage + strip injected fields before any
// logprob merging (merge touches choices only, usage is untouched).
let decode_body = self.shadow_record_non_stream(decode_body, status, &shadow);
if !return_logprob {
return (status, decode_body).into_response();
}
@@ -1265,6 +1730,71 @@ impl PDRouter {
}
}
/// G9i shadow bookkeeping for non-streaming responses: parse the body,
/// record usage into the prefix table (T2), pair the T3 queue admission
/// with exactly one complete (parseable body) or release (non-success /
/// unparseable), and strip `cached_tokens_details` when (and only when)
/// we injected the request flag ourselves.
///
/// Passthrough guarantees: shadow off / non-success status / unparseable
/// body / nothing stripped -> the ORIGINAL bytes are returned untouched,
/// so clients never see a re-serialized response unless we actually
/// removed an injected field.
fn shadow_record_non_stream(
&self,
body: bytes::Bytes,
status: StatusCode,
shadow: &Option<ShadowResponseContext>,
) -> bytes::Bytes {
let (Some(g9i), Some(ctx)) = (&self.g9i, shadow) else {
return body;
};
// Only 200 responses with usage may write the table (design §3.3-3).
// A non-success response still releases the T3 queue admission.
if !status.is_success() {
g9i.shadow_release(ctx);
return body;
}
let (parsed, rewritten, breakdown) =
super::g9i_shadow::strip_and_extract(&body, ctx.strip_cached_details);
match &parsed {
// TTFT calibration is streaming-only (non-streaming has no
// observable first-token moment) -> None. The breakdown was
// extracted pre-strip and is passed through — the parsed JSON
// here is post-strip, so re-extracting from it would always
// miss (the 2026-10-17 order bug).
Some(json) => g9i.shadow_record(ctx, json, None, breakdown),
// Unparseable success body: nothing to record, but the dispatch
// is over — release rather than leak the outstanding count.
None => g9i.shadow_release(ctx),
}
match rewritten {
Some(bytes) => bytes::Bytes::from(bytes),
None => body,
}
}
/// Assemble the non-streaming passthrough response. The shadow strip
/// may have REWRITTEN (shortened) the body, so the upstream
/// Content-Length in `headers` is stale; forwarding it verbatim
/// truncated cache-hit responses at exactly the stripped length (the
/// 2026-10-17 IncompleteRead incident). Pin Content-Length to the
/// actual body length — correct for rewritten and untouched bodies
/// alike.
fn non_stream_passthrough_response(
status: StatusCode,
body: bytes::Bytes,
mut headers: HeaderMap,
) -> Response {
if let Ok(v) = HeaderValue::from_str(body.len().to_string().as_str()) {
headers.insert(CONTENT_LENGTH, v);
}
let mut response = Response::new(Body::from(body));
*response.status_mut() = status;
*response.headers_mut() = headers;
response
}
// Helper to process prefill response and extract body if needed for logprobs
async fn process_prefill_response(
&self,
@@ -1780,6 +2310,7 @@ mod tests {
retry_config: RetryConfig::default(),
api_key: Some("test_api_key".to_string()),
enable_igw: false,
g9i: None,
}
}
@@ -1791,6 +2322,39 @@ mod tests {
Box::new(worker)
}
#[test]
fn non_stream_passthrough_pins_content_length_to_body() {
// 2026-10-17 IncompleteRead regression: the shadow strip shortens
// the body on engine cache hits; the upstream Content-Length must
// never survive onto the rewritten body.
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(CONTENT_LENGTH, HeaderValue::from_static("637"));
let body = bytes::Bytes::from_static(b"{}");
let resp =
PDRouter::non_stream_passthrough_response(StatusCode::OK, body.clone(), headers);
assert_eq!(
resp.headers().get(CONTENT_LENGTH).unwrap(),
&HeaderValue::from_static("2"),
"stale upstream length is replaced by the actual body length"
);
// Untouched body: the pinned length matches the original.
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(CONTENT_LENGTH, HeaderValue::from_static("2"));
headers.insert(CONTENT_TYPE, HeaderValue::from_static("application/json"));
let resp = PDRouter::non_stream_passthrough_response(StatusCode::OK, body, headers);
assert_eq!(
resp.headers().get(CONTENT_LENGTH).unwrap(),
&HeaderValue::from_static("2")
);
assert_eq!(
resp.headers().get(CONTENT_TYPE).unwrap(),
&HeaderValue::from_static("application/json"),
"other preserved headers survive"
);
assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::OK);
}
#[test]
fn test_chat_request_text_uses_full_conversation() {
// Regression test for https://github.com/sgl-project/sglang/issues/26263
@@ -2048,6 +2612,8 @@ mod tests {
None,
prefill_ref.clone(),
decode_ref.clone(),
None,
None,
);
// Guards are now attached to response body, so load should be 1
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ mod pd_responses_routing_tests {
retry_config: RetryConfig::default(),
api_key: None,
enable_igw: false,
g9i: None,
}
}